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INTRODUCTION
In 2007, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp.
1
2
v. Twombly, sending “shockwaves” through the federal litigation bar.
3
Seemingly without prior warning, the Court abrogated “the accepted
rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief”—the standard for deciding 12(b)(6) motions first stated fifty
4
years earlier in Conley v. Gibson. To replace the old rule, the Court
announced a new “plausibility” standard: that a complaint must

1. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the
Lower Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 852
(2008).
3. See, e.g., Thampi v. Collier County Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 2:04-cv-441-FtM29SPC, 2006 WL 2460654, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2006) (“The federal notice
pleading standards are well settled.”); McMahon, supra note 2, at 855 (“[T]he Conley
standard was clear and well-settled.”).
4. 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957); see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (“[A] party may assert
the following defenses by motion: . . . failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted . . . .”).
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allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
5
face.”
Twombly contained some indications that the Court intended to
6
limit its holding to Sherman Act cases. Nonetheless, the federal
courts largely embraced Twombly’s “plausibility” standard for all
7
cases. Almost two years to the day after Twombly, the Supreme Court
8
laid the matter to rest in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, holding that the Twombly
9
“plausibility” standard applies to all cases. Iqbal further explained
that “judicial experience and common sense” should inform the
10
“plausibility” standard.
In addition, Iqbal set forth a “two-pronged” approach to 12(b)(6)
motions. First, the court should identify and ignore all “conclusions”
from the complaint not entitled to be taken as true for purposes of
11
the motion to dismiss.
Second, the court should apply the
12
“plausibility” standard to the complaint’s remaining allegations.
If Twombly caused a shock, Iqbal struck a blow. A firestorm of
protest ensued over Iqbal’s alleged judicial activism. For example,
Senator Arlen Specter recently introduced a bill that would attempt
to turn the clock back by reinstating “the standards set forth by the
13
Supreme Court of the United States in Conley v. Gibson.”
Absorbed by the vigorous academic debate, I wondered if it could
be empirically demonstrated that district courts ruled much
differently on 12(b)(6) motions after Twombly. Thus, for this Article,
I conducted an empirical analysis of the effects of the different
Supreme Court standards on rulings on 12(b)(6) motions in the
federal district courts.
I chose, as randomly as possible, 1200 cases (500 from each of the
two-year periods before and after Twombly), and I coded the cases for
5. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
6. See id. at 553 (“We granted certiorari to address the proper standard for
pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct . . . .”); id. at
554–55 (“This case presents the antecedent question of what a plaintiff must plead in
order to state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act.”); id. at 558–59 (discussing the
expense of discovery in antitrust cases).
7. In reviewing cases to be selected for inclusion in this study, I found only one
district court case in which the court refused to apply Twombly in a non-antitrust case.
See Orthovita, Inc. v. Erbe, No. 07-2395, 2008 WL 423446, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14,
2008). Most of the U.S. Courts of Appeals eventually adopted the “plausibility”
standard for all civil cases, but some characterized Twombly as effecting only modest
change. See infra notes 137–144 and accompanying text.
8. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
9. Id. at 1953.
10. Id. at 1950.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Notice Pleading Restoration Act, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009).
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their rulings and other characteristics in a database (the “Database”).
Because Iqbal was decided recently, I chose (again, as randomly as
possible) 200 cases decided on 12(b)(6) motions under Iqbal from
May–August 2009, and I included them in the Database.
My statistical analysis of the cases in the Database suggests that a
surprisingly large percentage of 12(b)(6) motions was being granted
(with or without leave to amend) under Conley—46% from May 2005
to May 2007. From May 2007 to May 2009, after Twombly was decided,
the percentage of 12(b)(6) motions granted grew to 48%—not a
remarkable increase.
But since Iqbal was decided, a higher
percentage of 12(b)(6) motions has been granted: 56% of the
12(b)(6) motions from May 2009 to August 2009 were granted.
However, the short time span and smaller number of Iqbal cases
counsel caution in interpreting the data.
Part I of this Article describes Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal, and
surveys the development of the pleading standards in the fifty-two
years spanned by these cases.
I conclude, as have other
commentators, that although courts continued to pay lip service to
the “notice pleading” ideal of Conley, in practice, the standard was
seriously eroded by the time Twombly was decided. Iqbal, though,
contains not even a passing reference to notice pleading, and may
portend the end of this liberal regime in the federal courts.
Part II outlines the design of the empirical study, and Part III
presents a statistical analysis of the data. The analysis reveals that
49% of the 12(b)(6) motions were granted (with or without leave to
amend) over the time period of the study. Further, it confirms that
the rate at which such motions were granted increased from Conley to
Twombly to Iqbal, although grants with leave to amend accounted for
much of the increase. In addition, the results of a multinomial
logistic regression indicate that under Twombly, the odds that a
12(b)(6) motion would be granted with leave to amend, rather than
denied, were 1.81 times greater than under Conley, holding all other
variables constant. Under Iqbal, the odds that a 12(b)(6) motion
would be granted with leave to amend, rather than denied, were over
four times greater than under Conley, holding all other variables
constant. Moreover, in the largest category of cases in which
12(b)(6) motions were filed—constitutional civil rights cases—
motions to dismiss were granted at a higher rate (53%) than in all
cases combined (49%), and the rate 12(b)(6) motions were granted
in those cases increased from Conley (50%) to Twombly (55%) to Iqbal
(60%).
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Part IV concludes, with some caution, that Twombly and Iqbal have
significantly increased the rate at which 12(b)(6) motions have been
granted by district courts, and suggests that this result, if desirable,
should be accomplished by the normal rule amendment process
rather than by a ruling of the Court.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL PLEADING STANDARDS
A. The World Before Twombly

The reformist philosophy and merits-based focus of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”), first adopted in 1938, have been
14
well chronicled elsewhere. For my purposes here, it suffices to say
that Rule 8(a)(2) of the FRCP—unchanged since 1938—requires a
complaint (or other pleading seeking relief) to contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
15
relief.” The drafters chose this language deliberately to signal the
softening of an earlier pleading regime known as “code pleading,”
under which the equivalent requirement was that a complaint
16
contain a “statement of the facts constituting the cause of action.”
Case law in code pleading regimes had devolved into endless,
technical bickering about distinctions between “ultimate facts,”
17
“evidence,” and “conclusions.” Thus, the FRCP’s use of the phrase,
“claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” instead of the
phrase from the code pleading standard, “facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action,” was an attempt to create a standard that would

14. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 575 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting that Rule 8 of the FRCP was designed with flexibility to allow more frequent
examination of the merits of a claim); Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and
the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 890–98 (2009) (highlighting the
vision of the FRCP drafters to make pleading rules more fair and efficient); Charles
E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 458–60 (1943) (recognizing that
complicated pleading requirements led to a call for reform); Richard L. Marcus,
The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
433, 437–51 (1986) (noting that a general dissatisfaction with pleading requirements
led to simplification of the rules).
15. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
16. Anthony J. Bellia, Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 794
(2004) (quoting Act of Apr. 12, § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. Laws 521).
17. Marcus, supra note 14, at 438 (explaining that Code pleading “invited
unresolvable disputes about whether certain assertions were allegations of ultimate
fact (proper), mere evidence (improper), or conclusions (improper),” and that
courts had “great difficulty distinguishing ultimate facts from conclusions since so
many concepts, like agreement, ownership[,] and execution, contain a mixture of
historical fact and legal conclusion” (citation omitted)).
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reach the merits of a dispute rather than one that would terminate a
18
plaintiff’s case on technical grounds at the outset.
Yet there were still rival pleadings philosophies. One of the FRCP’s
primary draftsmen, Judge Charles Clark, was convinced that
pleadings motions were wasteful and often unjust, and would have
19
eliminated them altogether.
The opposing camp, however,
emphasized the need for some screening effort to prevent
20
nonmeritorious cases from proceeding.
The Supreme Court in
Conley sided mostly with Judge Clark, at least for the moment.
Conley v. Gibson
The Conley “no set of facts” language materialized in the Court’s
opinion even though the lower courts had not discussed the pleading
issue and even though the plaintiffs had hardly briefed the issue
21
before the Court. Conley was brought as a putative class action by
“certain Negro members of the Brotherhood of Railway and
Steamship Clerks . . . against the Brotherhood, its Local Union No.
22
28 and certain officers of both” (collectively, the “Union”).
Plaintiffs alleged that they were employed by the Texas and New
Orleans Railroad in Houston, and that Local 28 was their designated
23
bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”).
The
collective bargaining agreement between the railroad and the Union
provided some protection to the Union members against loss of
24
employment or seniority. The complaint alleged that despite the
existence of this protection, the railroad had “abolished” forty-five
jobs held by Negroes and then refilled (through a wholly owned
subsidiary) those jobs with either white employees or Negroes
1.

18. See, e.g., Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944). Referring to
the district court’s grant of a 12(b)(6) motion under the Code pleading standard,
Judge Clark stated, “[H]ere is another instance of judicial haste which in the long
run makes waste.” Id.
19. Clark, supra note 14, at 456.
20. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 14, at 890 (identifying many courts’ concerns about
backlog, costs, and delay as reasons to support a higher level of screening).
21. Despite Justice Black’s statement in Conley that the issue had been “briefed . .
. by both parties,” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957), in fact, only the Union
expressly addressed pleading issues in its brief to the Supreme Court. See Petitioner’s
Brief at 3–4, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (No. 7), 1957 WL 87661
[hereinafter Pet’r’s Br.]. For a further discussion of the “accidental” nature of
Conley’s prominence, see Emily Sherwin, The Story of Conley: Precedent by Accident, in
CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 295 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2008).
22. Conley, 355 U.S. at 42. Gibson, the named defendant, was the General
Chairman of Local Union No. 28.
23. Id. at 43; see also Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as
amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–88 (2006)).
24. Conley, 355 U.S. at 43.
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“rehired” with loss of seniority. The complaint alleged further that
despite plaintiffs’ requests, the Union did nothing to prevent or
protest these discriminatory discharges as it would have done if the
26
plaintiffs had been white.
Plaintiffs’ legal claim was that the Union had violated their rights
27
to fair representation under the RLA. The Union moved to dismiss
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction (arguing that the National
Railroad Adjustment Board (“Adjustment Board”) had exclusive
jurisdiction), failure to join an indispensable party (the railroad), and
28
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The lower courts addressed only the jurisdictional issue, and thus
found it unnecessary to reach the pleading issue. The district court
held that it lacked jurisdiction under the RLA “since plaintiffs
raise[d] no question of the lawfulness of the selection of Local 28 as a
bargaining agent, nor of the validity of [the collective] bargaining
29
agreement.”
The appellate court affirmed per curiam and
essentially without opinion, except for the citation of two cases
30
regarding jurisdiction.
The Conley Court made short shrift of the jurisdictional issue,
pointing out that this was a dispute between an employee and his
union and that the RLA conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the
Adjustment Board only in “disputes between an employee . . . and a
31
carrier.” The Court then cursorily held that the railroad was not an
indispensable party and then turned to the pleading issue for which
32
the case is known.
Frequently, courts citing Conley overlook that fact that the Court’s
pleading analysis proceeded in two parts, only the first of which
invoked the infamous “no set of facts” language. The two parts
correspond to two ideas often invoked in pleadings disputes:
the legal sufficiency of a claim and the requisite level of specificity of
33
the allegations.

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Conley v. Gibson, 138 F. Supp. 60, 62 (S.D. Tex. 1955), aff’d, 229 F.2d 436
(5th Cir. 1956), rev’d, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
30. Conley v. Gibson, 229 F.2d 436, 436 (5th Cir. 1956), rev’d, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
31. Conley, 355 U.S. at 44 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) (2006)).
32. Id. at 45.
33. See, e.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)
(stating that a court can dismiss where a legal theory is not asserted or where
sufficient facts are not alleged).
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The Union made both arguments in its Supreme Court brief, but it
did not organize or label them as such. First, as to “legal sufficiency,”
the then-governing law under Supreme Court precedent was “that an
exclusive bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act is obligated
to represent all employees in the bargaining unit fairly and without
discrimination because of race and . . . the courts have power to
34
protect employees against such invidious discrimination.”
The
Union conceded this principle, but argued that the complaint’s
allegation that the Union failed to protest the firings and rehirings
was insufficient to constitute discrimination; otherwise, a union
would be required to protest each time a union member had a
35
grievance with an employer, regardless of the merit of the grievance.
Admittedly, this is a strained argument that conveniently overlooks
the thrust of the complaint; but in concept, it is a legal sufficiency
argument: plaintiff complains that the Union did not protest, but the
duty of fair representation does not require it to protest.
At this point, the Court expounded the “no set of facts” language
that Twombly would later abrogate:
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course,
the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief. Here, the complaint alleged, in part,
that petitioners were discharged wrongfully by the Railroad and
that the Union, acting according to plan, refused to protect their
jobs as it did those of white employees or to help them with their
grievances all because they were Negroes. If these allegations are
proven there has been a manifest breach of the Union’s statutory
duty to represent fairly and without hostile discrimination all of the
36
employees in the bargaining unit.

As to the “factual specificity” branch of its pleading argument,
the union asserted:
The factual allegations of the Complaint are completely vague as to
what provisions of, or in what manner, the bargaining agreement
was violated by the Railroad when it abolished the particular jobs in
question . . . . There are no factual allegations that it ever
happened before, or that it happened pursuant to an agreement
between the Railroad and Respondents . . . [W]hat specific conduct by
the [Union] discriminated against [plaintiffs] in favor of white
34. Conley, 355 U.S. at 42 (citations omitted).
35. Brief for Respondents Pat J. Gibson, et al. at 32, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41
(1957) (No. 7), 1957 WL 87662 [hereinafter Resp’ts Br.].
36. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46 (citations omitted).
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employees and thus constituted a breach of its statutory duty of fair
37
representation?

In other words, the Union argued that the complaint’s allegations
of discrimination were conclusory.
Justice Black could have
responded in kind to the Union’s lack-of-specificity argument by
38
either pointing out that the complaint did make such allegations, or
that the specificity the Union wanted was irrelevant under the
39
substantive law.
Instead, the Court retorted with the general
philosophy of notice pleading:
The decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts
upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules
require is “a short and plain statement of the claim” that will give
the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the
40
grounds upon which it rests.

This is the part of Conley that remains good law under Twombly—
and maybe Iqbal.
2.

The 12(b)(6) spiel
For decades, courts have started their opinions with boilerplate
language about the governing standards of a 12(b)(6) motion, the
41
gist of which is learnedly described by Wright & Miller, but which I
have irreverently come to call the “12(b)(6) spiel.” The “no set of
facts” versus “plausibility” standard is only a portion of the spiel.
Of course, courts frequently begin their recitations by quoting Rule
8(a)(2).
After Conley, the boilerplate language almost always
included that case’s two best-known quotes: the “no set of facts”

37. Resp’ts Br., supra note 35, at 26–27, 31.
38. For example, the complaint alleged that the defendant violated the security
provisions of the bargaining agreement. Conley, 355 U.S. at 42–43. The complaint
also alleged that the railroad and the Union had entered into a “Union Shop
Contract” which also contained security provisions that the defendant violated.
Pet’r’s Br., supra note 21, at 4.
39. Under the substantive law, the Union’s actions could have been
discriminatory even if the Union had not agreed with the railroad to engage in
discrimination and even if the Union had not engaged in this conduct on any other
occasion than the one in question. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–88 (2006); see also Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
40. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
41. See 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1357, at 417 (3d ed. 2004) (“[F]or purposes of the motion to dismiss,
(1) the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
(2) its allegations are taken as true, and (3) all reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from the pleading are drawn in favor of the pleader.”).
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quote and the “fair notice” quote. But there is more to the spiel,
only some of which finds roots in Conley.
a.

The “extraordinary” nature of 12(b)(6) motions

Courts’ descriptions of the governing standards often open with a
43
statement that 12(b)(6) motions are “rarely granted” and “only in
44
because a complaint’s threshold for
‘extraordinary’ cases”
45
sufficiency is “exceedingly low.” Although this may once have been
46
an accurate assessment, it is now a gross understatement of the
efficacy of 12(b)(6) motions.
b.

The plaintiff gets the benefit of the doubt

The boilerplate language also usually contains the principle that
the court should give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt on a
47
12(b)(6) motion. This concept is expressed in various formulations,
such as that the court must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
48
plaintiff” or must view the complaint’s allegations “in the light most
49
favorable to the plaintiff” or that the complaint must be “liberally
50
However, these liberal
construed in favor of the plaintiff.”
inferences have a limit: “unwarranted” factual inferences and
51
deductions are insufficient.

42. See, e.g., Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 445 F.3d 586, 590–91 (2d Cir. 2006)
(referencing immediately the “no set of facts” and “fair notice” requirements
established in Conley at the beginning of the discussion section); Bodine Produce,
Inc. v. United Farm Workers Org. Comm., 494 F.2d 541, 556 (9th Cir. 1974) (same).
43. E.g., Lightfoot v. OBIM Fresh Cut Fruit Co., No. 4:07-CV-608-BE, 2008 WL
4449512, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2008).
44. E.g., Feregrino v. Micro Focus (US) Inc., No. 08cv2026 JM(JMA), 2009 WL
33308, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2009).
45. E.g., Rivers v. Residential Servs. Group, Inc., No. 8:08-cv-84-T-30TBM, 2008
WL 2776250, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 15, 2008).
46. See 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, at 565 (“[R]elatively few complaints
fail to meet this liberal [pleading] standard . . . .”).
47. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (“[I]t is well established
that, in passing on a motion to dismiss, whether on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter or for failure to state a cause of action, the allegations of the
complaint should be construed favorably to the pleader.”).
48. E.g., King v. Simpson, 189 F.3d 284, 287 (2d Cir. 1999).
49. E.g., Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1484 (11th Cir. 1994).
50. E.g., Lowery v. Texas A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997).
51. See, e.g., Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003)
(stating that such conclusions “masquerad[e] as facts” and alone are insufficient to
prevent dismissal); Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir.
1987) (acknowledging that the court need not give weight to overly tenuous factual
inferences in considering motions to dismiss).
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Pro se plaintiffs get even more benefit of the doubt
52

Pro se complaints are also supposed to be construed liberally,
although it is unclear how this standard differs from that applied to
plaintiffs represented by counsel. Other formulations are that pro se
53
complaints should be “interpret[ed] charitably” and dismissed
54
“only in the most unsustainable of cases.”
d.

The complaint does not have to identify the legal name for the claim
it is attempting to assert

Probably stemming from the pro se plaintiff’s unintentionally
55
hilarious efforts in Dioguardi v. Durning, courts have explained that
“[t]here is no rule that requires a complaint to allege the statutory
56
basis upon which a cause of action is founded.” As Judge Posner
pointed out, Rule 8(a)(2) does not require that a complaint must set
forth its legal basis; but once the complaint is challenged on a
57
12(b)(6) motion, the pleader must identify some legal basis. Courts
are not inclined to root out the right cause of action for the plaintiff.
e.

The “conclusory” conundrum

An important part of the boilerplate language refers to the court’s
obligation on a 12(b)(6) motion to credit as true the complaint’s
factual allegations, but not its legal conclusions. It is difficult to
discern the origins of this notion in modern federal practice. Conley

52. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (stating that a complaint filed pro se,
“however inartfully pleaded,” is considered less stringently than pleadings filed with
the aid of counsel (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972))).
53. E.g., Williams v. Anderson, 959 F.2d 1411, 1417 n.4 (7th Cir. 1992) (reading
the complaint in light of the plaintiff’s history of mental health problems); see also
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972) (providing the pro se plaintiff with an
opportunity to offer proof in support of his claim for relief despite the Court’s
inability to “say with assurance” that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to entitle
him to relief).
54. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant # 1, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008)
(quoting Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 216 (2d Cir. 2008)).
55. 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944) (highlighting portions of the pro se plaintiff’s
complaint—regarding a customs officer’s seizure of plaintiff’s “medicinal tonics” and
subsequent sale at auction—which contained such gems as, “It isnt [sic] so easy to do
away with two cases with 37 bottles of one quart. Being protected, they can take this
chance.”).
56. E.g., Darnell v. Hoelscher, Inc., No. 09-cv-204-JPG, 2009 WL 1768655, at *2
(S.D. Ill. June 23, 2009); see, e.g., Daniels v. USS Agri-Chemicals, 965 F.2d 376 (7th
Cir. 1992) (concluding that under federal and state pleading, the plaintiff need not
include any theory of the case in a notice pleading system).
57. See Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999)
(stating that it is unresponsive for a plaintiff to refuse to offer the basis of a
complaint after a defendant has presented a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss).
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mentioned nothing about it; nor do the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The rule that legal conclusions are not accepted as true probably
reaches back to code pleading, under which “legal conclusions” were
not accepted as true on a demurrer (the code pleading forerunner to
58
The concept is sensible when the alleged
a 12(b)(6) motion).
“conclusion” is a fanciful misstatement of the law or a misapplication
of the law to the facts. Take the following conclusion for example:
“My roommate, the defendant, did not do his laundry for three
months. Therefore, he has committed the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.” In such a situation, the court would
ignore its role as the gatekeeper of substantive law if it credited the
legal conclusion of the “tort.”
Whatever its source, the dividing line between allegations accepted
59
and not accepted as true has been phrased in a myriad of ways. The
characterization of allegations accepted as true has run the gamut
60
61
62
from “all allegations” to “all material allegations” to “facts” to
63
64
“all factual allegations” to “all well-pleaded factual allegations.”
The characterization of allegations that a court is not bound to
65
accept as true has ranged from “legal conclusions” to “sweeping
66
67
legal conclusions” to “bare assertion[s]” to “bare assertion[s] of
68
legal conclusions”
to “bald assertions [and] unsupportable
69
70
conclusions” to “conclusory allegations” to “conclusory recitations

58. See, e.g., Gillispie v. Goodyear Serv. Stores, 128 S.E.2d 762, 765 (N.C. 1963).
59. See 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, at 504–21 (“Nothing appears to turn
on the differences in these semantic formulations of the standard.”).
60. E.g., Schrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 1405 (3d Cir. 1991).
61. E.g., Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).
62. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788, 792 (2009)
(“Because this case comes to us on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), we assume the truth of the facts as alleged in petitioners’
complaint.”).
63. E.g., Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg’l Ctrs.-Glen Hazen, 570 F.3d 520, 523
(3d Cir. 2009).
64. E.g., Baker v. Kingsley, 387 F.3d 649, 660 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). The phrase “well-pleaded facts” simply seems to be a
tautological description of allegations that are not conclusory.
65. E.g., Lovick v. Ritemoney Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing
Jeanmarie v. United States, 242 F.3d 600, 602–03 (5th Cir. 2001)).
66. E.g., Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2002).
67. E.g., Florance v. Buchmeyer, 500 F. Supp. 2d 618, 626 (N.D. Tex. 2007).
68. E.g., Allard v. Weitzman (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d 1236, 1240
(6th Cir. 1993).
69. E.g., Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996).
70. E.g., Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007).
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71

of law” to “legal conclusion[s] couched as [or ‘masquerading as’]
72
73
fact[s]” to my personal favorite, “periphrastic circumlocutions.”
The near-impossibility of distinguishing “conclusion” from “fact” is
74
nicely illustrated by the 1986 case of Papasan v. Allain. By the time
this case was decided, the rule that “for the purposes of this motion
to dismiss we must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as
true, [but] we are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
75
couched as a factual allegation” was set in stone. The Court applied
this rule to the complaint’s allegation that due to disparities in
government funding, schoolchildren in the Chickasaw Counties had
been deprived of a “minimally adequate education,” and rejected the
allegation as conclusory:
The petitioners do not allege that schoolchildren in the Chickasaw
Counties are not taught to read or write; they do not allege that
they receive no instruction on even the educational basics; they
allege no actual facts in support of their assertion that they have
been deprived of a minimally adequate education. As we see it, we
are not bound to credit and may disregard the allegation that the
76
petitioners have been denied a minimally adequate education.

Contrast another of the complaint’s allegations which satisfied the
Papasan Court as not too conclusory: “The allegations of the
complaint are that the State is distributing the income from . . . lands
or funds unequally among the school districts, to the detriment of
77
the Chickasaw Cession schools and their students.” The Court did
not decry the lack of “actual facts in support of” plaintiffs’ assertion of
78
“detriment.” Could not the alleged “detriment” just have been the
Trojan Horse version of the lack of “minimally adequate education”
that had already been rejected? It is unclear why the first allegation is
79
conclusory and the second is not.
71. E.g., Zelenka v. NFI Indus., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 701, 704 (D.N.J. 2006).
72. See, e.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (“[W]e are not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”); Mezibov v. Allen,
411 F.3d 712, 716 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[L]egal conclusions masquerading as factual
conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.”).
73. E.g., Buck v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 476 F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 2007).
74. 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
75. Id. at 286.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 287–88.
78. Id. at 286.
79. In another recent example of the invisible line between “conclusions” and
“facts,” one court rejected a claim because the claim only contained a “single,
conclusory assertion that [the defendant] ‘sought . . . to appropriate and disclose the
names of [plaintiff’s] customers.’” All Bus. Solutions, Inc. v. NationsLine, Inc., 629
F. Supp. 2d 553, 558–59 (W.D. Va. 2009) (quoting Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint ¶ 23). Should the plaintiff have described how the defendant broke into
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As another example of the conclusory facts dilemma, Justice
Stevens and other scholars have pointed out that the judicial refusal
to credit a “conclusory” allegation as true on a 12(b)(6) motion is
seemingly inconsistent with the conclusory nature of the official
forms following the FRCP, which “suffice under these rules and
80
illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.”
For example, Form 11, a complaint for negligence, states in its
operative entirety, “On date, at place, the defendant negligently drove
a motor vehicle against the plaintiff,” and then proceeds to allege
81
damages.
How can Form 11’s allegation that “the defendant
82
negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff” not be a
conclusion, whether of fact or law? Justice Stevens thinks it is a “bare
83
allegation,” but one that is acceptable on a 12(b)(6) motion; Justice
Souter is satisfied that the allegation as a whole is not conclusory
84
because it gives a date, a time, and a place.
The problem is that one person’s “conclusion” is another person’s
85
“fact.” The continuing debate demonstrates exactly why the drafters
of the FRCP intended to sweep away the failed code-pleading
attempts to distinguish “evidence” from “ultimate facts” and
“conclusions.”
3.

The resistance to “notice pleading”
In the years before Twombly, the Court tried to slap down any
pleading standard that lower courts had the audacity to call
“heightened” in relation to the general notice pleading standard of
Rule 8(a)(2). In Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
86
Coordination Unit, the Court reversed the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to impose an explicitly
“heightened pleading standard” applied to claims against
its office and stole a Rolodex, or how the defendant copied computer files, and gave
them to a competitor?
80. FED. R. CIV. P. 84; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 576 (2007)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (commenting on the Twombly majority’s inconsistency with
the hypothetical pleadings in Form 9 of the FRCP); Bone, supra note 14, at 875 & n.4
(noting that courts have departed from the “liberal ethos” of the FRCP).
81. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11 (formerly Form 9).
82. Id.
83. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 576 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 565 n.10 (majority opinion) (“A defendant wishing to prepare an
answer in the simple fact pattern laid out in Form 9 would know what to answer;
a defendant seeking to respond to plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations in the § 1 context
would have little idea where to begin.”).
85. See 20 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE DESKBOOK
§ 72, at 635 (2002) (“[T]he distinction between facts and conclusions is one of
degree only, not of kind.”).
86. 507 U.S. 162 (1993).
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87

municipalities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
88
N.A., the Court reversed the Second Circuit’s imposition of a “prima
facie case” pleading standard applied to employment discrimination
89
claims. These were easy cases given the structure of the FRCP. Rule
9(b) imposes only a “particularity” requirement in pleading claims of
90
“fraud or mistake,” so every claim that is not for “fraud or mistake”
91
falls within 8(a)(2)’s “short and plain statement” requirement.
But lower courts continued to attempt to evade the notice pleading
92
For
standard, virtually ignoring Leatherman and Swierkiewicz.
example, despite Leatherman, some courts continued to apply an
explicit “heightened pleading” standard to § 1983 complaints
brought against an individual defendant, especially when the
defendant asserted the defense of qualified immunity with a
93
subjective intent element or when the plaintiff alleged supervisory
87. Id. at 164–65.
88. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
89. Id. at 509–10.
90. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
91. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512–13.
92. See generally Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L.
REV. 987 (2003) (discussing the regularity with which district courts avoided the
simplified pleading standard in favor of consolidating an ever-growing federal
docket).
93. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2003)
(“In examining the factual allegations in the complaint, we must keep in mind the
heightened pleading requirements for civil rights cases, especially those involving the
defense of qualified immunity.”); Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002)
(holding that although Rule 8(a)(2) governs, “[p]laintiffs suing governmental
officials in their individual capacities . . . must allege specific conduct giving rise to a
constitutional violation”); Ramirez v. Dep’t of Corr., 222 F.3d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir.
2000) (explaining that when a qualified immunity defense is asserted, the court will
“apply a heightened pleading standard, requiring the complaint to contain ‘specific,
non-conclusory allegations of fact sufficient to allow the district court to determine
that those facts, if proved, demonstrate that the actions taken were not objectively
reasonable in light of clearly established law’” (quoting Dill v. City of Edmond,
155 F.3d 1193, 1204 (10th Cir. 1998))); see also Truvia v. Julien, 187 F. App’x 346, 348
(5th Cir. 2006) (calling the proscription in Oliver an imposition of a “heightened
pleading standard”). Contra Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 294 (3d Cir. 2006)
(refusing to “apply [the] heightened pleading standard in cases in which a
defendant pleads qualified immunity”); Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v.
Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2004) (rejecting any heightened pleading
standard in federal civil rights actions unless the FRCP specifically impose such a
standard); Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002)
(reviewing the history of the heightened pleading standard and finding that the
heightened pleading of a defendant’s improper motive in constitutional tort cases is
no longer required); Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 914–16 (10th Cir. 2001)
(holding that courts may no longer impose a heightened pleading requirement for
cases in which the defendant officially raised the defense of qualified immunity after
finding no support for such an imposition from federal statutory law or from the
FRCP); Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1432 (5th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that the
“heightened pleading standard is a departure from the usual pleading requirements
of [Rules] 8 and 9(b)” (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy,
J., concurring))).
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94

liability.
In addition, despite Swierkiewicz, some lower courts
continued to apply a “prima facie case” pleading requirement in
95
employment discrimination cases.
Even if they did not use the term “heightened,” courts still
attempted to accomplish the same result by different means. The
method of choice was the prohibition against “conclusory”
allegations, especially in civil rights cases.
Justifications for tightening up “notice pleading” in civil rights
cases usually focused on the disruption to government operations
that could result from a flood of meritless cases and government
officials’ entitlement through qualified immunity to protection from
96
litigation as well as from liability. With this study, I quantified a part
of the problem: constitutional civil rights cases accounted for 32% of
97
the 12(b)(6) motions in the Database. I discovered another facet of
the civil rights problem after reading hundreds of cases for this study:
I began to experience a sinking feeling every time I came across a
constitutional civil rights case—particularly, but not exclusively, with
a pro se plaintiff—for I knew there was a good chance the claims
would be jumbled, the number of defendants massive, the legal
98
theories botched, and the story sad. Perhaps similar sentiments—in
addition to the oft-stated concerns about litigation disrupting daily
government operations—have motivated federal courts to adopt a
more scrutinizing approach throughout the tortured history of
pleading standards in civil rights cases.

94. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998)
(“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged
wrongs . . . . Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal
direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or
actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate
particularity.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Lynn v. Tobin, No. 07-1622, 2009
WL 1971430, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 7, 2009) (“The Third Circuit has adopted a specific
pleading standard for civil rights claims.”).
95. E.g., Totten v. Norton, 421 F. Supp. 2d 115, 120 (D.D.C. 2006).
96. For a discussion of the arguments for and against a heightened pleading
standard in civil rights cases from a critical race theory perspective, see Roy L. Brooks,
Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to Federal Pleading, 11 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 85, 107–10 (1994).
97. See infra Figure 4.
98. In legions of cases, plaintiffs appear to be unaware of a host of legal
principles including: the doctrine of sovereign immunity; the difference between
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985; the inability of municipalities to be sued on a
respondeat superior theory; and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Many civil rights plaintiffs
also fail to understand the redundancy in filing claims against a government
employee in his or her “official capacity” and the governmental entity; when to use
the Eighth versus the Fourteenth Amendment in claims of deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs; and when exhaustion of administrative remedies is required.
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B. The New “Plausibility” Standard: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
Twombly had its genesis in the break-up of AT&T’s local telephone
business into the “Baby Bells,” also known as Incumbent Local
99
Exchange Carriers (“ILECs”).
The Telecommunications Act of
100
1996 sought to facilitate competition in local telephone service by
permitting Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (“CLECs”) to use
101
networks belonging to ILECs. The Twombly plaintiffs, representing
a putative class of all subscribers of local telephone or high-speed
102
internet service from 1996 onward, sued the ILECs, including Bell
103
Atlantic, for antitrust violations under the Sherman Act, which
prohibits a “contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of
104
trade or commerce.”
The complaint alleged that the defendant ILECs engaged in
anticompetitive conduct through (1) their “parallel conduct” in
adopting certain practices that discouraged competition from the
CLECs, and (2) their failure to compete with each other in local
105
service in their respective service areas. However, taken alone, this
conduct was not sufficient for liability under the Sherman Act, which
requires an anticompetitive agreement or conspiracy among the
defendants. The complaint therefore attempted to allege the critical
element of “agreement” or “conspiracy” in several ways.
First, the complaint alleged that the ILECs stayed out of each
other’s territory even when one ILEC’s geographic operating area
surrounded another ILEC’s operating area. For example, defendant
ILEC SBC served California and Nevada, but defendant ILEC Qwest
106
served all the states bordering California and Nevada.
In this
context, the complaint alleged:
Richard Notebaert, the former Chief Executive Officer of
Ameritech, who sold the company to Defendant SBC in 1999 and
who currently serves as the Chief Executive Officer of Defendant
99. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549 (2007).
100. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 47 U.S.C.).
101. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 549.
102. Id. at 550. The complaint was filed on behalf of the plaintiffs by the former
law firm of Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP. Unfortunately for the
plaintiffs, former partners of Milberg Weiss were indicted around the time the case
was heard in the Supreme Court. See Julie Creswell, Partner at Law Firm Resigns to
Focus on Criminal Charges Against Him, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2006, at C3.
103. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7
(2006)).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
105. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550–51.
106. Complaint ¶ 37, at 12, Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02-cv-10220-GEL), 2003 WL 25753160.
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Qwest, was quoted in a Chicago Tribune article as saying it would be
fundamentally wrong to compete in the SBC/Ameritech territory,
adding “it might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that
107
doesn’t make it right.”

The complaint alleged further that congressional representatives
and other persons considered Notebaert’s statement evidence of an
108
anticompetitive conspiracy.
Second, the complaint alleged that “[e]laborate” or “frequent
communications” among the ILECs to agree to allocate markets
would not have been necessary because “four defendants . . .
account[ed] for as much as ninety percent or more of the markets
109
The
for local telephone services within the 48 contiguous states.”
complaint also alleged that the ILECs did “indeed communicate
amongst themselves through a myriad of organizations, including but
not limited to the United States Telecom Association, the
TeleMessaging
Industry
Association,
the
Alliance
for
Telecommunications Industry Solutions, Telecordia, Alliance for
Public Technology, the Telecommunications Industry Association
110
and the Progress and Freedom Foundation.”
In support of its allegation that the “[d]efendants ha[d] engaged
in parallel conduct in order to prevent competition,” the complaint
provided twelve examples of wrongful acts in which all the ILECs had
111
engaged. These acts included double-billing the CLEC’s customers
who converted from an ILEC and failing to provide a quality
112
interconnection between the network and those of competitors.
With this background, the complaint then alleged:
In the absence of any meaningful competition between the
[ILECs] in one another’s markets, and in light of the parallel
course of conduct that each engaged in to prevent competition
from CLECs . . . . Plaintiffs allege upon information and belief that
Defendants have entered into a contract, combination or
conspiracy to prevent competitive entry in their respective local

107. Id. ¶ 42, at 14.
108. The Illinois Coalition For Competitive Telecom allegedly characterized
Notebaert’s reported statement as “evidence of potential collusion among regional
Bell phone monopolies to not compete against one another and kill off potential
competitors in local phone service.” Id. ¶ 44, at 14. Further, after Notebaert’s
reported statement, U.S. Representatives John Conyers and Zoe Lofgren allegedly
asked the Antitrust Division to “investigate whether the [ILECs] are violating the
antitrust laws by carving up their market territories and deliberately refraining from
competing with one another.” Id. ¶ 45, at 15.
109. Id. ¶ 48, at 18.
110. Id. ¶ 46, at 15.
111. Id. ¶ 47(a)–(l), at 15–18.
112. Id.
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telephone and/or high speed internet services markets and have
agreed not to compete with one another and otherwise allocated
113
customers and markets to one another.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
114
The Second
York granted the defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion.
Circuit reversed, holding that under the “no set of facts” test from
115
Conley, the complaint stated a claim for relief.
The Supreme Court reversed. The majority, in an opinion by
Justice Souter, began with Rule 8(a)(2) and the “fair notice” quote
116
from Conley. It continued with another part of the 12(b)(6) spiel:
factual allegations, but not legal conclusions, are accepted as true,
117
“even if doubtful.”
But the Court left out a key piece of the boilerplate language.
It said nothing about how a plaintiff on a 12(b)(6) motion was to get
the benefit of the doubt. There were no admonishments to draw all
reasonable inferences, or liberally construe the allegations in the
plaintiff’s favor.
Instead, it dropped the “plausibility” bombshell:
[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the
line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be
118
dismissed.

The Court explained that requiring “plausible grounds” for relief
was not a “probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply
calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that
119
discovery will reveal evidence” of the alleged wrongdoing.
This
expectation was particularly important in an antitrust case, where
discovery can be massive and ruinously expensive.
The Court’s opinion was short on explaining the criteria by which
120
plausibility was to be judged. Apparently, “plausible” is more than
121
“possible” but less than “probable.”
In addition, Justice Souter
113. Id. ¶ 51, at 19.
114. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
115. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 106, 109 (2d Cir. 2005).
116. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
117. Id. at 555–57.
118. Id. at 570.
119. Id. at 556.
120. Cf. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (“Some improbable
allegations might properly be disposed of on summary judgment, but to dismiss
them as frivolous without any factual development is to disregard the age-old insight
that many allegations might be ‘strange, but true; for truth is always strange, Stranger
than fiction.’” (citation omitted)).
121. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
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suggested that plaintiffs’ allegations of conspiracy against the ILECs
122
should be judged “in light of common economic experience.”
The Court did not attempt to define the group for which the
economic experience would be “common,” whether it be economists,
monopolists, consumers, judges, Americans, or some other cohort.
Applying the “plausibility” standard, the Court noted that the
alleged parallel conduct among the ILECs and their failure to
123
compete with one another was consistent with legal behavior.
The complaint’s “stray” allegations of illegal “agreement” among the
124
ILECs were mere legal conclusions.
“[W]hen viewed in light of
125
common economic experience,” the defendants’ acting to keep out
the CLECs was just “the natural, unilateral reaction of each ILEC
126
intent on keeping its regional dominance.”
“[A]n obvious
alternative explanation” for defendants’ failure to compete with each
127
Thus, the
other was that they were born-and-bred monopolists.
Court held, nothing in the complaint made its conclusory allegations
128
of an illegal “agreement” among defendants “plausible.”
Along the way, the Court held that the “no set of facts” standard
129
from Conley “ha[d] earned its retirement” :
The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an
accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated
adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts
130
consistent with the allegations in the complaint.

The Court mistakenly cited Swierkiewicz, among other cases, for this
131
In fact, Swierkiewicz stated the proposition thus:
proposition.
“Given the Federal Rules’ simplified standard for pleading, ‘[a] court
may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be
granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the
132
allegations.’”
There is no difference between the “no set of facts”
rule and the “any set of facts” rule—indeed, two of the cases Conley

122. Id. at 565.
123. Id. at 554.
124. Id. at 564.
125. Id. at 565.
126. Id. at 566.
127. Id. at 567–68.
128. Id. at 564–65.
129. Id. at 563.
130. Id.
131. Id. (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 504, 514 (2002)).
132. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 (emphasis added) (quoting Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).
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cited for the “no set of facts” principle actually used the language
133
“any state of facts.”
Two weeks after Twombly, the Court issued a per curiam opinion,
134
Erickson v. Pardus, in which it rejected the argument that a
prisoner’s civil rights complaint for deliberate indifference to serious
135
Erickson cited Twombly only for
medical needs was too conclusory.
the “fair notice” part of Conley and the standard proposition that
“a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in
136
the complaint” on a 12(b)(6) motion.
The Court did not even
refer to the “plausibility” standard, reinforcing speculation that
“plausibility” was confined to the antitrust context.
Twombly, however, garnered much more attention than Erickson.
Some commentators expressed concern that Twombly constituted
improper judicial activism, was inconsistent with the merits focus of
137
the FRCP, and might further erode access to justice.
Others
claimed that Twombly was either correctly decided on its facts,
clarified existing principles, or would not have a significant practical
138
effect on rulings.

133. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 n.5 (citing Cont’l Collieries, Inc. v.
Shober, 130 F.2d 631, 635 (3d Cir. 1942)) (explaining that a case may not be
dismissed unless it appears that a plaintiff cannot prevail under “any state of facts”);
Leimer v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 108 F.2d 302, 306 (8th Cir. 1940)
(“[W]e think there is no justification for dismissing a complaint for insufficiency of
statement, except where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled
to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim.”).
Nevertheless, some courts continue to favorably cite the “any set of facts” rule after
Twombly. E.g., Torres v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 08-98J, 2009 WL 1322564, at *1 (W.D. Pa.
May 12, 2009); Gregory Surgical Servs., LLC v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of
N.J., Inc., No. 06-0462 (JAG), 2009 WL 749795, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2009); Zawacki
v. Realogy Corp., 628 F. Supp. 2d 274, 278 (D. Conn. 2009). Notably, at least one
court has continued this trend even after Iqbal. E.g., Ahern v. Omnicare ESC LLC,
No. 5:08-CV-291-FL, 2009 WL 2591320, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2009).
134. 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam).
135. Id. at 93.
136. Id. at 93–94.
137. See, e.g., Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading
Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1014–16 (2009)
(examining dismissal rates of employment discrimination cases before and after
Twombly and recommending a more cautious use of the “plausibility” standard);
A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 453–54 (2008)
(arguing that the rule amendment process is the proper way to change pleading
requirements).
138. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 14, at 889 (“Most complaints that pass muster under
notice pleading should also pass muster under plausibility pleading.”); Richard A.
Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary
Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 62 (2007) (applauding the result of Twombly,
but not the underlying analysis, for preventing futile and expensive discovery);
Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2009)
(finding Twombly’s standard “relatively clear” and mandated by the Federal Rules).

574

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:553

Both sides had a point. On the one hand, when a pleading’s
sufficiency as a “short and plain statement . . . showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief” under Rule 8(a)(2) has been interpreted
for fifty years under the “no set of facts” standard, suddenly
substituting a “plausibility” standard looks very much like an end-run
139
around the constraints on the judiciary’s rule-making power.
In addition, whatever the practical effect of the change, the two
standards have very different aspirational connotations: to allow a
complaint to stand unless “no set of facts” would support it suggests
an intent to err on the side of upholding the pleading; to require a
complaint to be “plausible on its face” suggests a more suspicious
attitude towards pleadings. On the other hand, the lower federal
courts have been chafing at the “notice pleading” standard for
decades, particularly in civil rights cases, and numerous opinions, law
review articles, and treatises have counseled that the Conley “no set of
facts” standard is “somewhat hyperbolic” and is not to be applied
140
literally.
Meanwhile, most federal courts of appeals seemingly sided with the
more sanguine view of Twombly, concluding that it did not
141
considerably alter the pleading standard.
Instead, Twombly was
described as imposing “two easy-to-clear hurdles”: notice to the
142
defendant and plausibility.
Nonetheless, the exhortation that the
allegations must support a claim that is “plausible on its face” smacks
of weighing evidence or of disbelieving the complaint’s allegations,

139. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–74 (2006) (prescribing the
procedure by which the Supreme Court shall make the FRCP, including submission
to Congress before becoming effective).
140. Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV.
1749, 1750 (1998); see, e.g., Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir.
1984) (“[T]he exceedingly forgiving attitude towards pleading deficiencies . . . in
Conley v. Gibson . . . has never been taken literally.”); Doe v. Norwest Bank Minn.,
N.A., 909 F. Supp. 668, 671 (D. Minn. 1995) (“[T]he [‘no set of facts’] phrase is not
applied literally . . . .”).
141. E.g., Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)
(“[T]he Supreme Court never said that it intended a drastic change in the law, and
indeed strove to convey the opposite impression . . . .”); Boykin v. Keycorp, 521 F.3d
202, 213–14 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that Twombly does not significantly alter the
lenient, notice-focused standard used to assess the complaint of a pro se litigant);
Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 526 F.3d 291, 296 n.1 (6th Cir. 2008)
(acknowledging circuit courts’ interpretations of Twombly that “did not significantly
alter notice pleading”). But see St. Germain v. Howard, 556 F.3d 261, 263 n.2 (5th
Cir. 2009) (“Twombly jettisoned the minimum notice pleading requirements of Conley
v. Gibson.”); Morgan v. Hanna Holdings, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 2d 404, 407 (W.D. Pa.
2009) (“[Twombly] required a heightened degree of fact pleading in an anti-trust
case.”).
142. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Concentra Health Servs., 496
F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007).
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143

neither of which may be done on a 12(b)(6) motion. At least one
court’s misquoting of the new standard as requiring “enough
plausible facts” illustrates the misunderstanding that the word may
144
generate.
C. Twombly on Steroids: Ashcroft v. Iqbal
Twombly’s “plausibility” standard was new and startling, but left
most of the 12(b)(6) spiel intact, and, like it or not, can fairly be seen
as better enunciating what lower courts were already doing, given
their mistrust of notice pleading. Iqbal is a different story.
Javaid Iqbal’s complaint grew out of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s (“FBI”) massive investigation following the September
11, 2001, attacks by al-Qaida on the World Trade Center and other
145
targets.
Iqbal alleged that “all Arab Muslim men [within the New
York area] arrested on criminal or immigration charges while the FBI
was following an investigative lead into the September 11th attacks—
however unrelated the arrestee was to the investigation—were
immediately classified as ‘of interest’ to the post-September-11th
146
investigation.”
Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim, was one of those men. Charged on
November 5, 2001, with fraud in connection with identification
documents, he alleged that he and other Muslim men were classified
as persons “of high interest” based solely on their race, national
147
origin, and religion.
As such, he was confined in a hastily
constructed post-September-11th maximum security unit at the

143. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1989) (citations omitted)
(“What Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance are dismissals based on a judge’s
disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations.”); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(1974) (“The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on
the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not
the test.”); Hansen v. Native Am. Refinery Co., No. 2:06cv00109, 2007 WL 1108776,
at *3 (D. Utah Apr. 10, 2007) (“A court evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion should not
‘weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but [should] assess
whether the plaintiff’s claim alone is legally sufficient’ to provide relief.” (quoting
Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir.
1999))).
144. Halpin v. David, No. 4:06cv457-RH/WCS, 2009 WL 789684, at *3 (N.D. Fla.
Mar. 20, 2009).
145. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 147–48 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1937
(2009). Iqbal had a co-plaintiff, Ehad Elmaghraby, who settled with the United
States for $300,000 after the district court denied most of the defendants’ 12(b)(6)
motions. Id. at 147.
146. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04:CV-01809 JS SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005) (citation omitted).
147. Id. at *1 & n.1.
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Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn (“ADMAX SHU”).
Conditions in the ADMAX SHU were brutal: beatings and repeated
body-cavity searches; inadequate food, heat, and medical care; twentythree-hour-a-day solitary lockdown; interference with religious
149
practices and right to counsel; and ethnic insults. Yet Iqbal alleged
he was not “afforded the opportunity to contest his classification or
continued confinement in the ADMAX SHU,” where he was kept for
over six months, even after pleading guilty to the underlying criminal
150
charges.
151
After his removal to Pakistan, Iqbal filed a twenty-one-count
152
complaint asserting, among other things, Bivens claims against John
Ashcroft, former Attorney General of the United States, Robert
Mueller, Director of the FBI, and numerous other supervisory and
153
non-supervisory government officials. Ashcroft and Mueller, along
with many other supervisory defendants, moved to dismiss on the
grounds of qualified immunity and that the allegations of
participatory conduct by Ashcroft and Mueller were too
154
“conclusory.”
The district court, citing Conley’s “no set of facts” standard, denied
155
most of Ashcroft and Mueller’s motions to dismiss. But by the time
the case reached the Second Circuit on defendants’ interlocutory
appeal, Twombly had intervened. Struggling mightily to reconcile the
“conflicting signals” in Twombly itself as well as to navigate the morass
created by recent Supreme Court pleadings decisions, the Second
Circuit concluded: “[W]e believe the Court is not requiring a
universal standard of heightened fact pleading, but is instead
requiring a flexible ‘plausibility standard,’ which obliges a pleader to
amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where
156
such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.”

148. Id. at *2 & n.5.
149. Id. at *3–7.
150. Id. at *1 & n.1.
151. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1943 (2009).
152. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing a cause of action against federal officers for
constitutional violations).
153. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942.
154. Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *10, *20.
155. Id. at *35 (denying motion to dismiss claims of violation of Fifth Amendment
procedural due process, discrimination on the basis of religion and race under the
First and Fifth Amendments, and conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)).
156. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1937
(2009).

2010]

DO TWOMBLY AND IQBAL MATTER EMPIRICALLY?

577

Applying this standard, the Second Circuit held that no further
157
amplification was needed to render most of the claims “plausible.”
The court did dismiss the procedural due process claims against
Ashcroft and Mueller, but left the First Amendment, Equal
158
Protection, and § 1985 claims intact.
The Supreme Court majority, in a 5-4 opinion by Justice Kennedy,
159
reversed the Second Circuit.
In so doing, it espoused an
extraordinary interpretation of Twombly and federal pleading
practice—refuted bitterly in dissent by Justice Souter, the author of
160
the two-year-old Twombly.
The Court began with Rule 8(a)(2), but then omitted most of the
rest of the 12(b)(6) boilerplate language. Remarkably, the Court
never once referred to “notice pleading,” conspicuously failing to
even cite the Conley “fair notice” language preserved in Twombly
161
(Justice Souter, in dissent, cited the “fair notice” standard).
The Court also eschewed citation of Swierkiewicz or Leatherman, both
of which upheld “notice pleading” against creeping “heightened
pleading.” In fact, the Court did not expressly reject “heightened
162
pleading,” as Justice Souter had been careful to do in Twombly.
Also absent was any mention of giving the plaintiff the benefit of the
doubt or that all reasonable inferences should be made in the
plaintiff’s favor.
Instead, the Court turned to the Twombly “plausible on its face”
163
It brushed aside any doubt that the standard was to be
standard.
164
applied in all civil cases, not just antitrust cases.
The Court then
elaborated, “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
165
sense.”

157. Id. at 166 (“[A]ll of the Plaintiff’s allegations respecting the personal
involvement of these Defendants are entirely plausible, without allegations of
additional subsidiary facts.”).
158. Id. at 177–78.
159. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1941, 1954 (2009).
160. Id. at 1954–55 (Souter, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 1961.
162. Compare id. at 1949–50 (majority opinion) (suggesting that a pleading must
contain factual enhancement and noting that a court can choose to begin by
identifying pleadings that are not entitled to the assumption of truth), with Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (“[W]e do not apply any ‘heightened’
pleading standard . . . .”).
163. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
164. Id. at 1953.
165. Id. at 1950.
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Applying its own judicial experience and common sense, the
Second Circuit had found Iqbal’s claims against Ashcroft and Mueller
166
The Supreme Court majority did not; it held that the
plausible.
complaint did not “contain facts plausibly showing that petitioners
purposefully adopted a policy of classifying post-September-11
detainees as ‘of high interest’ because of their race, religion, or
167
national origin.”
Therefore, the Court held, the “complaint
fail[ed] to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for purposeful and
168
unlawful discrimination against petitioners.”
The applications of the “plausibility” standard by the Supreme
Court majority and the Second Circuit in Iqbal illustrate how
rudderless a guide that standard is. For the Second Circuit, what
made the alleged discriminatory policy “plausible” was the
169
unprecedented national security crisis on American soil. The same
national security crisis, for the Supreme Court majority, was what
made legitimate law enforcement purposes for the policy more
“likely” than purposeful discrimination, thus rendering purposeful
170
discrimination implausible.
One can only imagine Justice Souter’s distress over the majority’s
makeover of the “plausibility” standard. He reminded the Court that
Twombly involved allegations that were consistent with both legal and
illegal conduct, but that in Iqbal, “the allegations in the complaint . . .
171
[were not] consistent with legal conduct.” Further, he was reduced
to explaining elementary 12(b)(6) principles:
Twombly does not require a court at the motion-to-dismiss stage to
consider whether the factual allegations are probably true. . . . The
sole exception to this rule lies with allegations that are sufficiently
fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about little green
men, or the plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time
172
travel.

Far from embodying a notice pleading standard, Iqbal’s
interpretation of “plausibility” is equivalent to the “strong inference
of scienter” standard under the Private Securities Litigation Reform

166. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 166 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
167. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952.
168. Id. at 1954.
169. See Hasty, 490 F.3d at 166, 175–76 (2d Cir. 2007) (considering the likelihood
that senior officials would concern themselves with the formulation and
implementation of such policies).
170. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951–52 (choosing the “obvious alternative
explanation” that the arrest was based on potential terrorist connections).
171. Id. at 1960 (Souter, J. dissenting).
172. Id. at 1959.
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173

Act (PSLRA) —a heightened-plus pleading standard recently
174
described by the Court in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.
Just as the Court in Tellabs compared opposing inferences of lawful
and unlawful intent on a motion to dismiss under the PSLRA, the
Court in Iqbal compared opposing inferences of lawful and unlawful
intent on the part of Ashcroft and Mueller, and found the inference
175
of lawful intent more “likely.”
But the opinion did not stop there. The majority kept only one
part of the 12(b)(6) spiel, which it raised to new heights: the
principle that legal conclusions should not be accepted as true on a
12(b)(6) motion. The majority explained:
[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While
legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations. When there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should [1] assume their veracity
and [2] then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief. . . . Our decision in Twombly illustrates [this]
176
two-pronged approach.

Thus, Iqbal invites judges to bifurcate the analysis: eliminate from
consideration all the complaint’s conclusory allegations (whatever
that means) and then judge the complaint’s remaining allegations
under the “common sense” “plausibility” standard.
Far from
acknowledging that the so-called “two-pronged approach” constitutes
a radical change, the Court implied that Twombly had explicitly and
intentionally applied this “approach.”
177
This was disingenuous.
The Twombly Court did call the
complaint’s allegations of an “agreement” among the defendants a
178
“legal conclusion”—with which one could reasonably disagree.

173. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
174. 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007) (interpreting the PSLRA’s requirement that the
complaint in a securities fraud case “state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind,” to mean
that “an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it
must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of
nonfraudulent intent”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).
175. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.
176. Id. at 1950.
177. None of the 422 cases decided under Twombly that I reviewed for this study
applied anything like the “two-pronged approach” so allegedly plain from Twombly.
178. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007) (stating that the
allegation of an actual agreement was merely a legal conclusion resting on prior
allegations).
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But it did not banish the allegations from consideration. And even
assuming that the allegation of an agreement in Twombly was a “legal
conclusion,” this would have made no difference in Iqbal because the
Court in that case did not characterize Iqbal’s allegations as “legal
conclusions.” The Court called the rejected allegations in Iqbal “bare
assertions,” “formulaic recitations of the elements,” “bald
180
allegations,” and “conclusory.” Because it places no limit on what a
judge may or may not accept as true, or what it may or may not call a
legal conclusion, Iqbal opens the door for much wider rejection, on
an ill-defined basis, of a plaintiff’s allegations on a defendant’s
12(b)(6) motion.
181
Citing only the near-incomprehensible case of Papasin v. Allain,
the Court provided no workable clarification of what is and is not
“conclusory.”
Indeed, the Court failed to acknowledge the
definitional ambiguity of “conclusory” that has plagued the
profession for at least a century.
The bankruptcy of the “conclusory allegation” label was
demonstrated by the lower courts in Iqbal. The Iqbal district court
182
assumed “that plaintiffs’ [factual] allegations [were] true.”
The
district court noted only that “the parties disagree about how specific
and ‘nonconclusory’ an allegation of personal involvement must be
in order to survive a motion to dismiss where the defense of qualified
immunity has been asserted,” but concluded that Swierkiewicz
183
foreclosed any heightened pleading standard even in this situation.
The Second Circuit also credited all of the complaint’s allegations as
true, even while calling some of the allegations “not entirely
184
conclusory.”
The Supreme Court majority, on the other hand, shot so-called
185
“conclusory” allegations out of the complaint like so many skeet,
179. See id. at 566–67 (holding that nothing contained in the complaint suggests a
conspiracy, but acknowledging plaintiffs’ claims that collusion was necessary to cause
success by even one CLEC and that the ILECs’ parallel conduct suggested
conspiracy).
180. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.
181. See 478 U.S. 265, 285–89 (1986) (holding that a claim challenging
Mississippi’s distribution of public school land funds violated equal protection and
was sufficient to state a claim if it was determined that the differential treatment was
not rationally related to state interest).
182. Elamaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809 JG SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005).
183. Id. at *11–12.
184. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 158 (2d Cir. 2007).
185. It rejected as “conclusory” the allegations that Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of,
condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [Iqbal]” to brutal
conditions in ADMAX SHU “as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion,
race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest;” that
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leaving a mere skeleton of “factual” allegations for the court to
consider under the “plausibility” standard.
Justice Souter, in dissent, disagreed that any of the complaint’s
allegations were “conclusory,” and argued that there was “no
principled basis” for the distinction that the majority made between
186
He considered the
conclusory and nonconclusory allegations.
majority’s “singl[ing] out” of certain allegations “in isolation,” rather
187
than viewing the complaint as a whole, a “fallacy.” But it was more
than that; the majority’s decision overturned a long-accepted
principle on 12(b)(6) motions that when considering a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “[v]iew[] the complaint
188
as a whole, rather than any one statement in isolation.”
Iqbal
explicitly encourages judges to view the non-conclusory allegations in
isolation from the conclusory allegations. Just as juries are more
likely to rule for the defendant if they have to use a special verdict or
189
answer special interrogatories (rather than give a general verdict),
I can only see the “two-pronged approach” working in favor of
190
defendants.
The courts of appeals have been quick to notice a sea change in
191
Iqbal.
So far, most district courts have not explicitly characterized
192
Iqbal as a dramatic departure from earlier pleading standards.
“Ashcroft was the ‘principal architect’ of this invidious policy;” and that “Mueller was
‘instrumental’ in adopting and executing [the scheme].” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.
186. Id. at 1961 (Souter, J. dissenting).
187. Id.
188. E.g., Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir.
2004).
189. Cf. JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION 368–70 (1995) (noting the plaintiff’s
objections to the use of complicated special verdict forms because he felt it would
negatively impact his chance at winning).
190. Cf. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Detailed Fact Pleading: The Lessons of Scottish Civil
Procedure, 36 INT’L LAW. 1185, 1201 (2002) (“Pleading specificity requirements are
about limiting the scope of lawsuits from beginning to end.”).
191. See, e.g., McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 530 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting
Iqbal’s clarification that Twombly applied to all cases, and citing the Iqbal “judicial
experience and common sense” gloss on “plausibility”); Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574,
580–81 (7th Cir. 2009) (recognizing the changes in evaluating motions to dismiss
since Iqbal); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting
that after Iqbal, “pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice
pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more
than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss,” and concluding that
Iqbal’s “two-part analysis” of first “separat[ing]” the “factual and legal elements of a
claim” and “disregard[ing] any legal conclusions” and then applying the
“plausibility” standard puts “the final nail-in-the-coffin for the ‘no set of facts’
standard”); Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir.
2009) (commenting that “[e]xactly how implausible is ‘implausible’ remains to be
seen, as such a malleable standard will have to be worked out in practice,” and
quoting the “judicial experience and common sense” language).
192. See, e.g., Robinson v. Beard, No. 08-3156, 2009 WL 2215088, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
July 22, 2009) (“Notwithstanding these new dictates, the basic tenets of the Rule
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As this Article will demonstrate in the following Parts, however, it
appears that district courts after Iqbal are granting 12(b)(6) motions
at a much higher rate than they did under either Conley or Twombly.
Perhaps I am magnifying the importance of the “two-pronged
approach.” Only a minority of district courts citing Iqbal in the
Database I constructed even mentioned the “two-pronged
193
approach.” But the handful of courts that have literally applied the
new standard are disconcerting. In one case, the court excised
“conclusions” from the complaint and held that the complaint’s
allegations—that officers shot a man in the head in front of his wife
while the man, without resisting the officers, was attempting to drive
194
In another case, the court issued
to work—did not state a claim.
this non sequitur: “Plaintiff makes multiple allegations that the Court
considers to be legal conclusions that do not merit a presumption of
truth—specifically, the numerous variations of the allegation that
Joytoto sent (also transmitted, broadcasted, caused to be sent) the
195
unsolicited fax.”
The fact that district courts rarely segregate “conclusions” in
pleadings after Iqbal may simply be due to the nature of the task
which can be highly time-consuming without counsel’s help. As the
defense bar absorbs Iqbal’s teaching, we may see more motions

12(b)(6) standard of review have remained static.”). Of all the cases read for
inclusion in the Database, only one expressly acknowledged a significant change
wrought by Iqbal. See Kyle v. Holinka, No. 09-cv-90-slc, 2009 WL 1867671, at *1
(W.D. Wis. June 29, 2009). In Kyle, a § 1983 case, Judge Crabb reconsidered a
12(b)(6) motion that she had earlier denied. Id. She granted the motion under
Iqbal, stating that Iqbal “implicitly overturned decades of circuit precedent in which
the court of appeals had allowed discrimination claims to be pleaded in a conclusory
fashion,” and that under Iqbal, “an allegation of discrimination needs to be more
specific.” Id. Moreover, the application of Iqbal in some cases is confusing.
For example, in Lynn v. Tobin, No. 07-1622, 2009 WL 1971430 (E.D. Pa. July 7,
2009), the court found that the complaint’s allegations could “plausibly give rise to
an entitlement to relief” under Iqbal, but that the allegations were not specific
enough. Id. at *3.
193. E.g., Mason v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 09-361(JLL), 2009 WL 2634871,
at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 26, 2009); Petrusa v. Suffolk County Soc’y for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals, No. 05-CV-6017 (DRH), 2009 WL 1796996, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June
24, 2009).
194. Canas v. City of Sunnyvale, No. C 08-5771 JF (PVT), 2009 WL 2160572, at *3,
*4 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2009).
195. Consumer Prot. Corp. v. Neo-Tech News, No. CV 08-1983-PHX-JAT, 2009 WL
2132694, at *2 (D. Ariz. July 16, 2009); see also Goliad County v. Uranium Energy
Corp., No. V-08-18, 2009 WL 1586688, at *10, *10 n.7, *11 (S.D. Tex. June 5, 2009)
(holding in an environmental case that a plaintiff’s allegation that a defendant’s
“pattern of intentional disregard of these plugging requirements is sufficient to lead
to the inference of intent to emplace fluids in the subsurface” is a “conclusion of law”
not required to be accepted as true under Iqbal, and dismissing the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction).
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assisting the judge in identifying so-called “conclusions” that should
be ignored.
One could also speculate that Iqbal, which involved a claim of
qualified immunity at the highest levels of the Executive Branch, will
be limited to its unusual political context and that it will be allowed to
196
The months after Iqbal,
fade quietly into Bush v. Gore oblivion.
however, have refuted such speculation.
D. Where We Are Now
At this point, the law of pleading consists of pronouncements
197
worthy of Lao-tzu :
Courts do not require “heightened specificity,” but “conclusions”
are unacceptable. Never mind that if the pleader is concerned that
an allegation is “conclusory,” she would probably attempt to
remedy it by making the allegation more specific.
Plaintiffs must allege “facts,” but they need not be “detailed facts.”
Courts may or may not be required to construe the complaint in
the light most favorable to a plaintiff, but courts certainly cannot
grant a plaintiff “unwarranted” inferences of fact.
Courts are not to weigh evidence, evaluate witness credibility, or
judge the likelihood that a plaintiff will prevail at trial, but a
plaintiff’s claim must be “plausible on its face” in light of the
judge’s “judicial experience and common sense.”
Courts should construe a complaint as a whole, and should not
take any one statement in isolation, but if a court deems an
allegation to be “conclusory” under some undefined standard, then
the allegation may be ignored.

Such Tao-like paradoxes are not easily applied by judges and
lawyers.

196. 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (limiting the holding to the present circumstances of
the case, and cautioning that equal protection in election processes presents many
complexities).
197. See, e.g., TAO TE CHING No. 14 (Stephen Mitchell, trans., Harper & Row
Publishers 1988) (“Look, and it can’t be seen. Listen, and it can’t be heard. Reach,
and it can’t be grasped. Above, it isn’t bright. Below, it isn’t dark.”); id. at No. 2
(“When people see some things as beautiful, other things become ugly. When
people see some things as good, other things become bad.”).
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II. STUDY DESIGN
I now reach the question: does any of this academic discussion
matter? What is happening empirically to 1 2(b)(6) motions in the
federal district courts since Twombly and Iqbal were decided?
A. Scope of Cases Studied
198

First, I chose to study only federal district court opinions.
Although they are bound to follow precedent in their own circuit
court of appeals, district court judges are on the front line of
applying the standards on 12(b)(6) motions. District court opinions
also offer the closest look at the arguments lawyers use on 12(b)(6)
motions in daily practice.
Second, for the greatest equivalence in the populations of cases
decided under Conley and Twombly, I chose to limit my study of
opinions decided under the Conley “no set of facts” standard to the
two years immediately preceding Twombly. As of the date this Article
was written, Twombly had been in effect approximately two years.
Conley’s “no set of facts” standard was issued in 1957 and was not
abrogated until Twombly—a life span of fifty years.
The difficulty of generating a truly random sample using Boolean
searches on a legal database is apparent.
After some
199
experimentation, I designed search terms in Westlaw to find as
many cases as possible in the district courts decided on 12(b)(6)
200
At the time I
motions in the two years before and after Twombly.
198. I used opinions both “published,” in the sense of opinions bound in the West
Reporters, and “unpublished,” in the sense of opinions only available electronically
on Westlaw. Some scholars have suggested that the term “published” means any
opinion available electronically; every opinion in the Database is “published” under
this definition. Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts,
53 VILL. L. REV. 973, 985 (2008); see also David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey
R. Lidicker, Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 693
(2007) (defining a federal district court “opinion” as “any judicial disposition on
Westlaw or Lexis,” and an “order” as “any disposition that is not”). Many scholars
have noted that the reliability of a database consisting only of publicly available
opinions on Westlaw and Lexis cannot be easily tested. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank,
Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem
or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 591, 604 (2004) (“[T]he picture of a legal
landscape that emerges from published opinions, at whatever court level, is very
probably distorted.”); Levin, supra, at 988–94. This is especially true at the district
court level, where one estimate is that only 3% of all district court orders are
available on Westlaw and Lexis. Hoffman, Izenman & Lidicker, supra, at 710. Still,
unless and until the PACER electronic filing system for the federal courts becomes
text-searchable, researching all existing district court orders is almost prohibitively
resource-intensive. See, e.g., Levin, supra, at 987.
199. Earlier iterations of the search terms cast too wide a net.
200. For cases decided under Conley’s “no set of facts” standard in the two years
before Twombly, I searched the Westlaw DCT database using the following terms:
(‘12(b)(6)’ ‘12(c)’ & (‘conley’ /2 ‘gibson’) & ‘no set of facts’ & da(after 5/21/2005)
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performed these searches, they yielded 6010 cases under Conley and
6319 cases under Twombly. Using an online random number
201
generator, I randomly selected 500 cases from the 6010 cases
located in the two years before Twombly, and 500 cases from the 6319
cases located after Twombly for potential inclusion in the Database.
The decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal then intruded on May 18, 2009.
To locate as many district court cases as possible deciding a 12(b)(6)
motion under Iqbal, I again searched terms on Westlaw, limiting the
202
search to cases from May 19, 2009, to August 31, 2009. This search
generated 914 cases and I selected 200 of these cases using a random
number generator. Because the Iqbal cases span only three months
and are fewer in number than the Conley or Twombly cases, caution
should be used in drawing inferences from the Iqbal data.
1.

Cases excluded from the Database
Of the 1200 cases thus selected as randomly as possible, only 1039
were included in the Database (444 under Conley, 422 under Twombly,
and 173 under Iqbal). This was because the Westlaw searches, while
fairly narrow, still returned cases that I excluded from the Database
for various reasons:
(a)

I excluded sua sponte reviews of prisoners’ complaints
203
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) and
of complaints submitted with an application to proceed
204
District courts must review these
in forma pauperis.
complaints’ allegations and dismiss where the complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Although the courts purport to use the 12(b)(6)
standards—whether under Conley, Twombly, or Iqbal—in
screening these cases to determine whether the complaint

& da(before 5/22/2007)). For cases decided under Twombly’s “plausibility” standard
in the two years after Twombly, I searched the same database using the following
terms: (‘12(b)(6)’ ‘12(c)’ & (‘twombly’ /p ‘plausib!’) & da(after 5/21/2007) &
da(before 5/22/2009)). Admittedly, I arbitrarily chose to use Westlaw rather than
Lexis, but one empirical study suggests that Westlaw includes more district court
opinions than Lexis. See Hoffman, Izenman & Lidicker, supra note 198, at 710.
201. Research Randomizer, http://www.randomizer.org.
202. For cases decided under Iqbal, on August 31, 2009, I searched the Westlaw
DCT database using the following terms: (“Ashcroft” /2 “Iqbal” & “12(b)(6)” &
da(after 5/18/2009)).
203. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) (2006); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) (2006)
(describing conditions under which the court may review and dismiss a prisoner’s
suit brought under a § 1983 claim).
204. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).
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205

states a claim for relief, there appeared to be some
inconsistency in application, probably caused by the fact
that many pro se inmates are also proceeding in forma
206
pauperis.
More importantly, these cases were decided
without adversarial input from the defendant—thereby
possibly resulting in more cases passing muster than
might otherwise have occurred. In addition, the converse
possibility of bias against such litigants by the district
courts counseled against the inclusion of these cases.
(b)

I excluded cases that the court decided on other grounds
without considering an actual 12(b)(6) motion, even
though the 12(b)(6) standard might have been
mentioned or a 12(b)(6) motion might have been filed
207
(thus yielding its location by the Westlaw search). These
excluded cases fall into two subcategories:
(i)

(ii)

Cases decided on other types of motions to
dismiss, such as motions to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction,
improper venue, or failure to join an
indispensable party.
Cases decided on a type of motion other than a
motion to dismiss. For example, defendants
frequently move “to dismiss, or in the alternative,
for summary judgment” under FRCP Rule 56.
Summary judgment motions are decided under a
208
different standard than 12(b)(6) motions.

205. E.g., Cutchin v. Hogshire, No. 3:08CV802, 2009 WL 2899809, at *4 (E.D. Va.
Sept. 9, 2009).
206. For example, some courts state that they need not accept as true certain
factual allegations in an in forma pauperis complaint. E.g., Salcedo v. Rossotti,
636 F. Supp. 2d 35, 40 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that the court can “dismiss those claims
whose factual contentions are clearly baseless or describe fantastic or delusional
scenarios” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 327 (1989)).
207. The changing standard for dismissal on 12(b)(6) motions, however, may spill
over into motions decided under these other grounds. Courts deciding motions to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), for example,
frequently cite the 12(b)(6) standard as applicable, although the courts use varying
formulations. E.g., Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 299 n.1 (3d Cir. 2006)
(“[W]e note that the standard is the same when considering a facial attack under
12(b)(1) or a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).”).
208. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (“The judgment sought should be rendered if the
pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”).
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Accordingly, I excluded any case that was expressly
or impliedly decided under Rule 56. Another
common example of this type of excluded case is
on a claimant’s motion to amend a pleading,
where the opponent of the motion argues that the
amendment would be futile. Although, like the
PLRA screening cases, the court in theory applies
the 12(b)(6) standard to such motions to amend,
I chose to exclude these cases on the ground that
the strategic difference in the procedural posture
of a motion to amend could potentially affect the
ruling independently of the governing 12(b)(6)
standard.
(c)

I excluded cases decided under an explicit “heightened
pleading” standard, which is supposedly “heightened” in
relation to the (theoretically) “lower” default pleading
standard under Rule 8(a)(2). Thus, I excluded cases
209
alleging fraud, which must be pled with particularity,
210
cases brought under the PSLRA, which has additional
211
heightened pleading requirements, and derivative cases
212
filed under Rule 23.1.

209. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”). In addition, claims
other than common law fraud that allege some sort of underlying deception, such as
securities fraud, RICO, and qui tam actions under the False Claims Act, must also be
pled with particularity. Such cases are not governed by Twombly and Iqbal, which
purport only to interpret Rule 8(a)(2).
210. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4 (2006).
211. E.g., § 78u-4(b)(1) (stating that, in private actions in which the plaintiff
alleges that the defendant made misleading statements or omissions, “the complaint
shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons
why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or
omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed”); § 78u-4(b)(2) (stating that in
private actions for damages in which plaintiff must prove “that the defendant acted
with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or
omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind”).
212. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b) (In derivative actions, “[t]he complaint must be
verified and must . . . (3) state with particularity: (A) any effort by the plaintiff to
obtain the desired action from the directors or comparable authority and,
if necessary, from the shareholders or members; and (B) the reasons for not
obtaining the action or not making the effort.”).
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2.

Cases included in the Database
Cases that I did include in the Database (other than those involving
the archetypical 12(b)(6) motion by a defendant to dismiss a
complaint) were:
(a)

(b)

(c)

12(b)(6) motions to dismiss any opposing party’s pleading
(such as a plaintiff’s motion to dismiss a counterclaim,
or a third-party defendant’s motion to dismiss a thirdparty complaint).
12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings, which are
decided under the same standard as, and are functionally
213
equivalent to, 12(b)(6) motions.
Cases that included motions other than 12(b)(6), but
which also included a count or claim that was decided on
a separable 12(b)(6) issue. In such cases I omitted the
non-12(b)(6) count or claim from the coding of the cases
214
and included only the 12(b)(6) count or claim.

I thought that I might need to treat cases that were removed to
federal court differently than those originating in federal court.
What if the state court’s pleading standards were looser than the
federal court’s standards? Apparently, nobody thinks this is a
problem yet—I did not find a discussion of it in any removed case.
Because federal pleading is (probably) still known as “notice
pleading,” ostensibly the most liberal pleading standard, perhaps it is
assumed that no state’s pleading regime could be any more liberal.
After Twombly and Iqbal are thoroughly digested, this issue may
215
emerge if states reject the “plausibility” approach.

213. E.g., Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir.
2009); Pérez-Acevedo v. Rivero-Cubano, 520 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2008).
214. For example, one defendant might move to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction; I would not include the ruling on this defendant’s motion in the
Database. If the personal jurisdiction motion was denied, and that same defendant
also moved simultaneously to dismiss under 12(b)(6), I would include the 12(b)(6)
ruling in the Database. To take this example further, if that same defendant’s
personal jurisdiction motion was granted, but a second defendant moved to dismiss
under 12(b)(6), I included in the Database only the ruling on the second
defendant’s motion.
215. Cf. Carol L. Zeiner, When Kelo Met Twombly-Iqbal: Implications for Pretext
Challenges to Eminent Domain, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. (forthcoming 2010); Z.W. Julius
Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and Procedural
Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431 (2009) (analyzing potential problems that may
arise in a system where the state courts use Conley pleading standards and the federal
courts use a Twombly standard).
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B. Coding the Cases
I coded the following information (variables) for each opinion
included in the Database.
1.

Identifying information
(a)
(b)

2.

Identifying number: assigned number generated by the
random number generator.
Name and citation: names of parties and citation of the
case.

Independent variables
(a)

(b)
(c)

(d)

216

Circuit: judicial circuit within which the district court lies
(for example, if the opinion was written by a judge in the
Southern District of New York, I coded the case as coming
from within the Second Circuit).
Date: date of the opinion.
Type of judge: whether the opinion was written by a district
court judge or a magistrate judge. I coded as “district
court judge” cases which were decided by a district court
judge, cases in which a district court judge explicitly
217
incorporated a magistrate judge’s recommendation, and
cases in which a magistrate judge stated explicitly that the
parties had consented to the magistrate’s final ruling.
I coded as “magistrate judge” cases in which a magistrate
was making only a “recommendation” to the district court
judge and cases in which the magistrate judge’s status was
unclear.
Pro se status: whether the party whose pleading was being
challenged on a 12(b)(6) motion (most frequently, the
plaintiff) was represented by counsel or was proceeding
pro se. When unclear, I left this field blank.

216. See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Christina L. Boyd, On the Effective
Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part II, 60 VAND. L. REV. 801, 808
(2007) (“For purposes of designing their research projects, scholars tend to
differentiate between dependent variables—the outcomes or responses the researcher
is trying to explain—and independent variables—the factors that may help account for
or explain the outcome.” (emphasis added)).
217. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2006) (describing the “jurisdiction, powers, and
temporary assignment” of magistrate judges).
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Class action: whether the case was brought as a putative
class action (whether or not the class was actually
certified).
Nature of suit: Statistical difficulties may ensue when a
variable has so many subcategories that only a handful of
218
Further, experts in
observations fall under each.
empirical legal research warn of generating so much
219
detailed information that the main points are obscured.
Therefore, I tried to keep the number of values for this
variable to a minimum while simultaneously focusing on
the types of cases postulated to be most threatened by
Twombly and Iqbal.

I began with the major categories listed on the federal district court
220
Civil Cover Sheet : “Contract,” “Real Property,” “Torts,” “Civil
Rights,” “Prisoner Petitions,” “Forfeiture/Penalty,” “Labor,”
“Immigration,”
“Bankruptcy,”
“Property
Rights”
(meaning
221
intellectual property rights), “Social Security,” “Federal Tax Suits,”
and “Other Statutes.” It should be noted that I did not review the
Civil Cover Sheets actually filed in the cases in the Database to see
what box the plaintiff checked; I determined the nature of the suit
myself by reviewing each opinion.
For various reasons, it quickly became apparent that few to no cases
involving “Real Property,” “Forfeiture/Penalty,” “Immigration,”
“Bankruptcy,” “Social Security,” and “Federal Tax” engender
222
opinions on 12(b)(6) motions. Another way of putting this is that

218. See, e.g., MICHAEL O. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 201
(2d ed. 2001) (“For tables larger than 2 X 2, it is recommended that chi-squared not
be used if the expected cell frequency is less than 5 in more than 20% of the cells or
less than 1 in more than 10% of the cells.”).
219. See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Matthew M. Schneider, On the Effective
Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811, 1861
(2006) (arguing that graphical analysis should not be judged by how detailed it is,
but rather how quickly a reader can understand it).
220. See Civil Cover Sheet, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/JS044.pdf.
221. The boxes in this category include only “Copyright,” “Patent,” and
“Trademark.” See id.
222. Cases involving core “Real Property” (as opposed to a dispute over a lease,
which I coded as a “Contract”) constitute only a small fraction of cases filed in
federal district courts. See, e.g., JAMES C. DUFF, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR:
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 162–64 (2007), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/appendices/c2.pdf [hereinafter 2006 REPORT]
(presenting data demonstrating that real property actions comprised less than 2% of
all cases filed in U.S. district courts for the year ending September 30, 2006). There
were only two “Real Property” cases in the Database. I recoded these two cases as
“Contract.”

2010]

DO TWOMBLY AND IQBAL MATTER EMPIRICALLY?

591

Twombly and Iqbal have no practical effect on approximately 11% of
all cases in federal district court.
As for prisoner petitions, the vast majority of these cases in the
Database alleged civil rights violations. Accordingly, I coded them as
“Civil Rights.”
This left the following six major categories:
(i)

Contracts:
All types of contractual disputes,
including insurance contracts and leases.

(ii)

Torts: All types of common law tort claims (e.g.,
negligence, wrongful death, products liability,
tortious interference with contract, defamation,
conversion, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, breach of fiduciary duty), and claims
223
under the Federal Tort Claims Act and Alien
224
Tort Claims Act.

(iii)

Civil rights: These cases were also coded in four
subcategories:
[1]

Cases in which the plaintiffs alleged federal
constitutional violations, whether or not
they purported to bring the case under
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (equal rights under the
law), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil action for
deprivation of rights), 42 U.S.C. § 1985

“Forfeiture” and “Penalty” cases are brought overwhelmingly by the United States
and apparently 12(b)(6) motions are virtually unknown in such cases. See id.
None of the 1200 cases reviewed for the Database involved “Forfeiture” or “Penalty.”
The bulk of “Immigration” and “Bankruptcy” cases proceed in specialized courts;
in those narrow instances where the district court has jurisdiction, 12(b)(6) motions
appear to be uncommon. Only four “Immigration” cases and one “Bankruptcy” case
appeared in the Database; I recoded the five cases as “Other Statutes.”
“Social Security” cases comprise about 6% of all cases filed—for example, a
sizeable 14,404 cases in 2006—the vast majority against the United States. Id. Again,
none of the 1200 cases reviewed for the Database involved “Social Security,”
suggesting that “Social Security” cases are not normally amenable to 12(b)(6)
motions.
Finally, “Tax Suits” make up a tiny 0.6% of all cases filed, see id., and accordingly
generated only twelve of the cases in the Database. I recoded these twelve cases as
“Other Statutes.”
223. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–80 (2006).
224. Id. § 1350.
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[3]

[4]

(iv)

(conspiracy to interfere with civil rights),
or Bivens actions.
Cases in which the plaintiffs alleged
unlawful employment discrimination on
the basis of race, sex, religion, or national
origin under Title VII of the Civil Rights
225
Act of 1964.
Cases in which the plaintiffs alleged
violations of the Age Discrimination in
226
Employment
Act
(“ADEA”),
the
227
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
228
or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Any other civil rights actions, including sex
229
discrimination under Title IX.

Labor:
These
subcategories:
[1]

[2]

[Vol. 59:553

cases

were

coded

in

two

Cases brought under the Employee
Retirement
Income
Security
Act
230
(“ERISA”) or any other provision of the
231
Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).
Other labor cases, including those brought
under the Labor-Management Relations
232
Act (“LMRA”)
or the Railway Labor
233
Act.

(v)

Intellectual property: These include cases in which
the plaintiffs alleged copyright, patent, or
trademark infringement as well as in which the
plaintiffs alleged misappropriation of trade secrets.

(vi)

All other federal and state statutes: These cases were
also coded in four subcategories:

225. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (2006).
226. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2006).
227. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2006).
228. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
229. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
230. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), (c) (2006).
231. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (establishing penalties for failure to pay
minimum wage or overtime).
232. Id. § 185.
233. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–88 (2006).
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[2]

[3]

[4]
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234

Antitrust claims under the Sherman Act,
235
or state antitrust
the Clayton Act,
236
statutes.
Consumer credit claims, including cases
brought under the Truth-in-Lending Act
237
(“TILA”),
the Fair Debt Collection
238
Practices Act (“FDCPA”), the Fair Credit
239
Reporting Act (“FCRA”), or the Real
Estate
Settlement
Practices
Act
240
(“RESPA”).
Claims under the Racketeering Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act
241
(“RICO”).
242
All other federal or state statutory claims.

Once I chose these categories, the next issue became how to place
243
each case in a single category. The paradigmatic “one plaintiff, one
defendant, one claim” case that inhabits law school hypotheticals and
edited opinions in casebooks is not actually the mode in federal
district court, at least in cases that result in 12(b)(6) motions. Most
cases contain numerous legal theories that are usually alleged in
separate counts and that are frequently asserted against a multitude

234. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
235. Id. § 15.
236. E.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16720 (West 2008) (describing activities that
create a trust).
237. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2006).
238. Id. §§ 1692–1692p.
239. Id. §§ 1681–1681x.
240. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–17 (2006).
241. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2006).
242. This category includes claims brought under environmental statutes,
franchise statutes, provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, and a host of other
statutes not included within any of the other categories.
243. I considered coding the ruling on each count and/or each defendant
separately, and I test-coded about fifty cases this way. I abandoned this effort for two
main reasons. First, it was frequently impossible to discern the information I needed
from the opinions without looking at the actual pleadings filed. This is particularly
true in § 1983 cases, in which plaintiffs tend to lump several defendants and several
legal theories into a single count. The detailed chart of counts, defendants, and
claims prepared by Magistrate Judge Komives in Hann v. Michigan, No. 05-CV-71347DT, 2007 WL 1322328, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2007), was the exception, not the
rule, and that case was by no means atypical of the complexity of such cases. Second,
coding the ruling on each count and/or defendant as a separate data entry would
give cases with multiple counts more weight—in some cases at least ten times more
weight—than a single-count case.
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of defendants. To assign only one “nature of suit” to each opinion,
I devised guidelines that I applied consistently.
First, even if a plaintiff asserted more than one count in a
complaint, I only coded the count or counts that were challenged by
a 12(b)(6) motion and were governed by the normal pleading
standard of Rule 8(a)(2).
For example, assume that a complaint asserted three counts—for
breach of contract, fraud, and libel. Assume also that the defendant
filed a 12(b)(6) motion attacking only the fraud and libel counts, but
that the fraud motion was governed by the heightened pleading
standard of Rule 9(b). The contract claim was not challenged and
the fraud claim was not governed by the standard I am studying.
Therefore, I would code this case in the Database as a “Tort” (libel)
and then code only the court’s ruling on the libel claim.
A further application of the rule described above occurred when
another motion was made in addition to, or in the alternative to, a
12(b)(6) motion, such as a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction or a motion for summary judgment. For example, in a
case with two defendants, assume that “Defendant A” had moved to
dismiss a single count of negligence for lack of personal jurisdiction
and for failure to state a claim for relief. Assume also that
“Defendant B” had moved to dismiss two counts (e.g., a civil rights
claim and an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim) for
failure to state a claim, or in the alternative, for summary judgment.
Say that the court had granted Defendant A’s motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction, thereby mooting Defendant A’s
12(b)(6) motion. Say also that the court had stated that it had
decided the civil rights count of Defendant B’s motion under the
summary judgment standard, but that it had decided the intentional
infliction of emotional distress count of Defendant B’s motion under
the 12(b)(6) standard. I would have coded this case as a “Tort” and
then coded only the court’s ruling on the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim.
Second, applying the rule described above, if more than one count
in the opinion was challenged by a 12(b)(6) motion governed by
8(a)(2), I usually would have coded the “nature of suit” for this type
of case by the first such count appearing in the opinion. For
example, if a defendant had filed a 12(b)(6) motion against Count I
(for breach of contract) and Count II (for tortious interference with
contract), I would have coded this as a “Contract” case. On occasion,
though, I determined that one of the counts was more important and
more indicative of the case as a whole and coded the “nature of suit”
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by that count. For example, say that the defendant had moved to
dismiss Count I (for breach of fiduciary duty), Count II (for TILA
violations), and Count III (for FCRA violations). I would have coded
this case as “Consumer Credit” (within “Other Statutes”), as better
capturing the essence of the suit than “Tort.”
Third, I used only the parties’ and court’s designation of the legal
theories for relief, rather than supplying what I might have
considered the “better” claim. For example, in a pro se case filed by a
man asserting a civil rights claim against his eye doctor and
manufacturer Bausch & Lomb (claiming that his contact lens
244
solution caused him to go blind), it seemed to me that a products
liability claim was a better fit (and somewhat less ludicrous) than a
§ 1983 claim. But § 1983 was the claim that he had asserted and was
the claim that the judge ruled on, so I coded the case as
“Civil Rights.”
Fourth, claims for indemnification or contribution were classified
according to the nature of the underlying suit (usually, “Contract” or
“Tort”).
(g)

Authority: I coded the case as “Conley” if the court cited
Conley and used the Conley “no set of facts” standard as at
245
least one of the governing principles in the motion.
I coded the case “Twombly” if the court cited Twombly and
used some formulation of the Twombly “plausibility”
standard as at least one of the governing principles in the
246
motion. I coded the case “Iqbal” if the court cited Iqbal
as at least one of the governing authorities in deciding the
247
12(b)(6) motion.

244. Spears v. Bausch & Lomb, No. C2-06-470, 2007 WL 764305, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 9, 2007).
245. Because of the structure of the Westlaw search, I assumed that these criteria
would be met for every case found by the search in the two years before Twombly.
However, there was one case in which the court only cited Conley when repeating the
plaintiff’s arguments and did not clarify that the court itself was applying “no set of
facts.” I did not include this case in the Database.
246. Only one court in the cases I reviewed cited Twombly but refused to apply it to
a non-antitrust case. I did not include this case in the Database. Note that in
addition to citing Twombly, most district courts continue to cite Conley for the
“fair notice” quote when deciding 12(b)(6) motions.
247. In addition to citing Iqbal, most district courts in deciding 12(b)(6) motions
continue to cite Twombly for the “plausibility” standard and many district courts
continue to cite Conley for the “fair notice” quote.
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248

Ruling:
As should be evident from the foregoing
examples, I coded only the court’s ruling on counts that
were challenged by a 12(b)(6) (or 12(c)) motion under
the 8(a)(2) standard. As to those counts, I used the
following categories for the rulings on the motions:
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

Grant without leave to amend the pleading.
Grant with leave to amend the pleading.
Mixed ruling when the court granted the motion
(with or without leave to amend) on one or more
counts and denied the motion on one or more
counts.
Deny.

For some of the analyses, I later collapsed the two “grant”
subcategories into one: grant with or without leave to amend.
(b)

Pending case status: I attempted to gauge how frequently a
grant of a 12(b)(6) motion was fatal to the entire case.
I coded this variable as “no” if any part of the case
remained pending after the court’s ruling, and as “yes” if
the grant of the 12(b)(6) motion (perhaps in conjunction
with other rulings such as the grant of a summary
judgment motion) resulted in the dismissal of the entire
case.
III. RESULTS

I present the results of this study in two parts. Part III(A) contains
some descriptive statistics of the Database, presented in two-way tables
or graphs; for example, this Part presents the frequency of each
ruling outcome under each authority, as in Table 1. Part III(B)
presents the results of a multinomial logistic regression in which the
ruling on the 12(b)(6) motion is the dependent variable, and the
results of a logistic regression in which the dependent variable is
whether the case was entirely dismissed.
It is important to note that inferences—if any—to be drawn from
the statistics should be confined to the regressions. I believe that the
248. See Epstein, Martin & Boyd, supra note 216, at 808 (summarizing the
difference between dependent and independent variables).
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raw frequencies in Part III(A) may be of interest to the reader.
However, multiple factors may affect the ruling on the 12(b)(6)
motion, and two-way tables cannot account for any confounding
249
effects of other variables.
As presented in two-way tables, any
apparent relationships between the independent variables and
outcomes can be misleading.
A. Two-Way Tables and Graphs
1. Differences in overall rulings on 12(b)(6) motions
Figure 1 and Table 1 show the frequency of rulings on 12(b)(6)
motions in the Database under Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal. Both
Figure 1 and Table 1 show all four ruling categories: “grant without
leave to amend,” “grant with leave to amend,” “mixed,” and “deny.”
Figure 1
Percentage of Rulings in the Database on 12(b)(6) Motions
Under Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal
Grant, no amend
Grant, amend
Conley
Mixed
Deny
Grant, no amend
Grant, amend
Twombly
Mixed
Deny

Iqbal

Grant, no amend
Grant, amend
Mixed
Deny

0

10

20
30
Percentage of rulings

40

Database of 444 cases under Conley, 422 cases under Twombly, and 173 cases under Iqbal.

249. A confounding variable is one that is associated with both the dependent
variable and another independent variable. For example, say the dependent variable
is the presence or absence of heart disease, and that men suffer heart disease at an
increasingly higher rate than women as they age. The variable “age” is associated
with both the dependent variable, heart disease, as well as the independent variable,
“gender.” See DAVID W. HOSMER & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION
70–72 (2d ed. 2000).
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Table 1
Percentage of Rulings in the Database on 12(b)(6) Motions
Under Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal

Total

Iqbal

Twombly

Conley

(1039 cases between May 22, 2005 and August 31, 2009)
Frequency in the Database (expected frequency)
Percentage in the Database (95% confidence interval)
Grant,
no amend

Grant,
amend

Mixed

Deny

Total

177 (174)
40% (35–44%)

28 (42)
6% (4–9%)

123 (125)
28% (24–32%)

116 (104)
26% (22–30%)

444

165 (165)
39% (34–44%)

37 (40)
9% (6–11%)

125 (119)
30% (25–34%)

95 (99)
23% (19–27%)

422

64 (68)
37% (30–44%)

33 (16)
19% (13–25%)

44 (49)
25% (19–32%)

32 (41)
18% (13–24%)

173

406
39% (36–42%)

98
9% (8–11%)

292
28% (25–31%)

243
23% (21–26%)

1039

Pearson chi2(6) = 26.256, Pr = 0.000

Table 1 and Figure 1 show that under any authority, 12(b)(6)
250
motions are more frequently successful than one might suppose.
Clearly, the endlessly repeated old saw that “12(b)(6) motions are
251
viewed with disfavor and rarely granted” should be laid to rest.
250. The surprisingly large percentage of 12(b)(6) motions that are granted,
whether under Conley, Twombly, or Iqbal, has profound implications for the perceived
desirability of further “tort reform” or “lawsuit reform.” See, e.g., Patricia W.
Hatamyar, The Effect of “Tort Reform” on Tort Case Filings, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 559, 560–62
(2009) (arguing that tort reform creates barriers and reduces plaintiffs’ ability to
recover, thus causing a decrease in tort filings). At least in federal court, the
12(b)(6) motion appears to be a potent means for terminating a lawsuit in its early
stages.
251. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text.
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Of all 12(b)(6) motions in the Database, 39% were granted without
252
leave to amend and another 9% were granted with leave to amend.
Even before Twombly, these courts were already granting (with and
without leave to amend) almost half (46%) of all 12(b)(6) motions.
Looking at differences in rulings under different authorities, Table
1 and Figure 1 show that there was a slight decline in the proportion
of motions granted without leave to amend from the Database under
Conley (40%) to Twombly (39%) to Iqbal (37%). However, the
percentage of 12(b)(6) motions in the Database that were granted
with leave to amend increased from 6% under Conley to 9% under
Twombly to 19% under Iqbal. The proportion of “mixed” rulings also
increased slightly under Twombly to 30% as compared to 28% under
Conley, but then declined to 25% under Iqbal. The proportion of
motions denied—i.e., plaintiff wins—fell from 26% under Conley to
23% under Twombly to only 18% under Iqbal.
Keeping in mind my earlier point about the potentially
confounding effects of other variables, the results of a chi-squared
253
distribution test indicate that the different proportions in rulings
between cases decided under Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal are
254
“statistically significant.”
The probability that this distribution
occurred by chance is less than 0.1%. A “significant” chi square in a
contingency table such as Table 1 indicates that the variables forming
the table are related, but the chi square alone does not explain the
relationship. For more meaningful information, an analysis of each
cell’s contribution to chi square is performed. In Table 1, the largest
contributors to the chi square are grants with leave to amend under
255
256
Conley and grants with leave to amend under Iqbal.
252. Note, however, that the data also show that even if a 12(b)(6) motion is
granted without leave to amend, the entire case is not necessarily dismissed at that
time; part of the case often remains pending. See infra notes 277–279 and
accompanying text.
253. The chi-squared distribution is used to compare expected to actual values in
categorical data to test for statistical differences. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian
Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 792 n.268
(1995).
254. Epstein, Martin & Schneider, supra note 219, at 1813 n.3 (defining
“statistically significant” to mean a relationship whose “existence cannot be explained
by chance alone”). As the minimally acceptable level of so-called “statistical
significance,” researchers commonly require a maximum probability of 10%—and
preferably no higher than 5%—that the result could have occurred by chance.
See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ECONOMETRICS 18 (2005) (“Levels of significance
below 10 percent are rarely accepted.”).
255. The contribution is 4.599 of the chi square of 26.256. The adjusted residual
(residuals standardized to a normal distribution) is -2.978. An adjusted residual with
an absolute value of 2.58 or greater is significant at the 1% level. KEVIN DURRHEIM &
COLIN TREDOUX, NUMBERS, HYPOTHESES & CONCLUSIONS: A COURSE IN STATISTICS FOR
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 374–75 (2004).
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Any explanation I could postulate for why grants with leave to
amend are significantly less than expected under Conley and
significantly more than expected under Iqbal is entirely speculative.
Perhaps district courts were comfortable enough with the Conley
standard to confidently discern when a dismissal without leave to
amend would not be reversed on appeal, while the newness of the
Iqbal standard caused them to err on the side of allowing the plaintiff
one more chance to plead.
If the distribution of rulings includes only those cases decided
under Conley and Twombly (without including the cases under Iqbal),
there is an unacceptably high probability (35.9%) that the
257
differences could have occurred by chance.
In other words, the
differences in rulings between Conley and Twombly are not alone large
enough to reject the null hypothesis that Twombly alone had no effect
on courts’ rulings on 12(b)(6) motions—at least as measured by a
Pearson chi squared distribution.
As Table 1 shows, however, the inclusion of cases decided under
Iqbal increases the differences in proportions of rulings. At this early
point, Iqbal appears to have had a measurable impact on rulings.
Another way of looking at this is to examine the 95% confidence
intervals. The percentage of motions granted with leave to amend
under Iqbal (19%) is well above the high end of the 95% confidence
interval for cases decided under Conley (9%) and Twombly (11%).
The percentage of motions denied under Iqbal (18%) is below the
95% confidence interval for cases decided under Conley (22%) and
Twombly (19%).
Whether the noticeable increase in dismissals with leave to amend
under Twombly and Iqbal will eventually translate into dismissals with
prejudice remains to be seen. I am not aware of any empirical study
that examines how frequently complaints are amended after a
12(b)(6) motion is granted with leave to amend; given the high
percentage of pro se plaintiffs in the Database, one could speculate
that many do not even try to amend. Nor am I aware of any study
that examines how frequently a renewed 12(b)(6) motion directed to
an amended complaint is granted without leave to amend; many
plaintiffs may lack the legal competence or factual knowledge
(without discovery) to amend their complaints satisfactorily. In such
cases, a grant of a 12(b)(6) motion, even with leave to amend, will be

256. The contribution is 17.055, over half of the chi square of 26.256.
The adjusted residual
(residuals standardized to a normal distribution) is 4.753.
257. Pearson chi2(3) = 3.2166, Pr = 0.359.

2010]

DO TWOMBLY AND IQBAL MATTER EMPIRICALLY?

601

just the preliminary step in the dismissal of a complaint (or part
thereof) with prejudice.
In Table 2 and Figure 2 below, the ruling categories “grant without
leave to amend” and “grant with leave to amend” are combined into
one category, “grant.” Figure 2 shows the results of Table 2
graphically.
Table 2
Percentage of Rulings in the Database on 12(b)(6) Motions
(Three Ruling Outcomes)
(1039 cases between May 22, 2005 and August 31, 2009)
Frequency in the Database (expected frequency)
Percentage in the Database (95% confidence interval)
Grant

Mixed

Deny

Total

Conley

205 (215)
46% (42–51%)

123 (125)
28% (24–32%)

116 (104)
26% (22–30%)

444

Twombly

202 (205)
48% (43–53%)

125 (119)
30% (25–34%)

95 (99)
23% (19–27%)

422

Iqbal

97 (84)
56% (47–63%)

44 (49)
25% (19–32%)

32 (41)
18% (13–24%)

173

Total

504
49% (45–52%)

292
28% (25–31%)

243
23% (21–26%)

1039

Pearson chi2(4) = 6.716, Pr = 0.152
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Figure 2
Percentage of Rulings in the Database on 12(b)(6) Motions by Authority
Deny
Conley
Twombly
Iqbal

Mixed
Conley
Twombly
Iqbal

Grant
Conley
Twombly
Iqbal
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Percentage of rulings

With the “grant” categories combined, the increase in the grant of
12(b)(6) motions from Conley (46%) to Twombly (48%) to Iqbal
(56%) is more obvious. In the overall time period, 49% of 12(b)(6)
motions in the Database were granted.
However, the probability of the distribution in Table 2 and Figure
2, using only three subcategories for rulings (“grant,” “mixed,” and
“deny”), occurring by chance is 15.2% using a Pearson chi-squared
distribution test—too high for conventional statistical significance.
258
A multinomial logistic regression (discussed below) better isolates
the predictive effect of the authority on the ruling.
2. Differences in rulings by nature of suit
One of the important concerns about Twombly and Iqbal is their
259
potentially negative effect on access to justice.
Thus, pleadings
requirements applied to cases typically brought by individuals
(frequently on a contingent-fee basis)—such as civil rights, consumer
credit, or personal injury cases—would be of particular interest.
258. See infra Table 4.
259. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Groups Unite to Keep Cases on Docket: Plaintiffs’ Lawyers
Seek to Stop Dismissals After Iqbal Decision, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 21, 2009, at 31 (discussing
civil rights advocates’ perspective that plaintiffs do not have access to the facts
required to successfully plead after Iqbal).
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Let us first examine the frequency of different types of suits in the
Database. Figure 3 shows the percentage of cases selected by nature
260
of suit (using six simplified subcategories) and governing authority.
Figure 4 shows similar information, using the more detailed
261
subcategories for nature of suit.
Appendix Table A contains the
backup for Figures 3 and 4.
Figure 3
Percentage of Cases in the Database by Nature of Suit and Authority
Contract
Tort
Civil rts
Labor
IP
Other
stat

Conley
Twombly
Iqbal
Conley
Twombly
Iqbal
Conley
Twombly
Iqbal
Conley
Twombly
Iqbal
Conley
Twombly
Iqbal
Conley
Twombly
Iqbal
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Percentage of cases

40

Exact frequencies are presented in Appendix Table A.

260. See supra notes 221–241 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 221–241 and accompanying text.
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Figure 4
Percentage of Cases in the Database by Detailed Nature of Suit and Authority
Contract
Tort
IP
Const civ rts
Title VII
ADA/ADEA
Other civ rts
ERISA/FLSA

Conley
Twombly
Iqbal
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Cons credit
RICO
Other stat
0

10

20

30

Percentage of cases
Exact frequencies are presented in Appendix Table A.

Each bar in Figures 3 and 4 represents the percentage of cases in
the Database involving a specific type of suit, decided under a
particular authority. For example, of all cases in the Database
decided under Conley, 13% were “Contract” cases, 16% were “Tort”
cases, 43% were “Civil Rights” cases, 6% were “Labor” cases, 3% were
“Intellectual Property” cases, and 20% involved “Other Statutes”
(using the six simplified categories of Figure 3).
Clearly, 12(b)(6) motions in the Database were filed in civil rights
cases far more frequently than in any other type of case. Civil rights
cases overall comprised 44% of the Database, and this percentage
does not vary much among Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal. In particular,
constitutional civil rights cases (a subcategory of all civil rights cases)
accounted for 32% of all cases in the Database. Thus, constitutional
civil rights cases made up 74% (141/190) of all civil rights cases in
the Database under Conley, 73% (135/186) of all civil rights cases in
the Database under Twombly, and 71% (55/78) of all civil rights cases
in the Database under Iqbal. Falling well behind civil rights cases, the
next largest group of cases in the Database involved “Other Statutes”
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(including “Consumer Credit,” “Antitrust,” and “RICO”)—20%
under Conley, 21% under Twombly, and 23% under Iqbal.
The Database also permits an examination of the rulings on
12(b)(6) motions made in different types of lawsuits. Figure 5
presents the percentage of rulings by nature of suit for the whole
Database (cases decided under all three authorities). The exact
frequencies underlying Figure 5 are shown in Appendix Table B.

Figure 5
Percentage of Rulings in the Database on 12(b)(6) Motions
by Detailed Nature of Suit
Contract
Tort
IP
Const civ rts
Title VII
ADA/ADEA
Other civ rts
ERISA/FLSA
LMRA/other
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Cons credit
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Other stat
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Reference line at 49% shows overall average.
Exact frequencies presented in Appendix Table B.
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Each bar in Figure 5 represents the percentage of 12(b)(6)
motions in the Database receiving that type of ruling in that type of
suit. For example, of all “Contract” cases in the Database, 33% of
12(b)(6) motions were granted (with or without leave to amend),
35% received a mixed ruling, and 32% were denied.
Comparing the percentage of rulings in different types of cases in
Figure 5 (detailed in Appendix Table B) with the total percentage of
rulings in all cases listed in Table 2, we can see which types of cases
have a higher-than-average or lower-than-average percentage of a
certain ruling. For example, approximately 49% of all 12(b)(6)
motions in the Database were granted (with or without leave to
262
amend).
In cases involving “Contracts” (33%), “Torts” (44%),
“ERISA” (39%), “Intellectual Property” (33%), and “RICO” (39%),
the percentage of 12(b)(6) motions granted was lower than average.
In contrast, the percentage of 12(b)(6) motions granted (with or
without leave to amend) was above average in cases involving
“Constitutional Civil Rights” (53%), the “ADA and ADEA” (53%),
“LMRA and Other Labor” (60%), “Consumer Credit” (59%), and
“Other Statutes” (57%).
Figure 6 presents the percentage of cases in the Database in which
the 12(b)(6) motion was granted (with and without leave to amend)
by the six simplified categories for nature of suit, with the
percentages under Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal shown separately. The
exact frequencies underlying Figure 6 (as well as the frequency of
motions denied or receiving a mixed ruling) are shown in Appendix
Table C.

262. See supra Table 2.

2010]

DO TWOMBLY AND IQBAL MATTER EMPIRICALLY?

607

Figure 6
Percentage of 12(b)(6) Motions Granted
by Simplified Nature of Suit and Authority
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Exact frequencies presented in Appendix Table C.

Figure 6 indicates that for the most part, the percentage of motions
granted (with or without leave to amend) by nature of suit (for cases
in the Database) did not appreciably change before Iqbal was
decided. For example, about 32% of 12(b)(6) motions in “Contract”
cases decided under Conley were granted; in “Contract” cases decided
under Twombly, 35% of 12(b)(6) motions were granted.
From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal, however, we can discern an upward
trend in granting 12(b)(6) motions in some types of cases. The
percentage of 12(b)(6) motions granted in “Tort” cases increased
from Conley (40%) to Twombly (46%) to Iqbal (52%). The percentage
of 12(b)(6) motions granted in “Civil Rights Cases” grew from 50%
under Conley to 53% under Twombly to 58% under Iqbal. The
percentage of 12(b)(6) motions granted in cases involving “Other
Statutes” (including “Consumer Credit,” “Antitrust,” “RICO,” and
“Environmental,” among others) declined from Conley (53%) to
Twombly (50%), but then increased significantly to a whopping 72%
under Iqbal. As Figure 6 shows, however, much of the increase in
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“grants” under Twombly and Iqbal is comprised of grants with leave to
amend.
Figure 7 presents essentially the same information as Figure 6—the
percentage of 12(b)(6) motions in the Database granted (with or
without leave to amend) by nature of suit and authority—but broken
down into more detailed subcategories of nature of suit. Appendix
Table D presents the exact frequencies for Figure 7, as well as the
frequency of 12(b)(6) motions denied and given mixed rulings.
Figure 7
Percentage of 12(b)(6) Motions Granted
by Detailed Nature of Suit and Authority
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Exact frequencies presented in Appendix Table D.

Again, we can spot an increase in the granting of 12(b)(6) motions
(with or without leave to amend) from Conley to Twombly to Iqbal for
certain types of cases in the Database. The percentage of 12(b)(6)
motions granted (with or without leave to amend) in “Constitutional
Civil Rights” cases grew from 50% under Conley to 55% under
Twombly to 60% under Iqbal. The rate of granted 12(b)(6) motions
(with or without leave to amend) in “Title VII” cases went from 42%
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under Conley to 54% under Twombly to 53% under Iqbal. The rate of
granted 12(b)(6) motions in “Consumer Credit” cases soared from
47% under Conley and Twombly to 92% under Iqbal. The rate of
granted 12(b)(6) motions (with or without leave to amend) in cases
involving “Other Statutes” (not including “Antitrust,” “Consumer
Credit,” or “RICO”) grew from 54% under Conley to 56% under
Twombly to 68% under Iqbal.
In some categories, differences that appear large (such as a
decrease in percentage of motions granted in “Other Civil Rights”
cases—not including “Constitutional Civil Rights,” “Title VII,” “ADA
or ADEA”—from 70% under Conley to 36% under Twombly to 0%
under Iqbal) may be skewed as a result of the small number of cases in
that category. For “Other Civil Rights,” the Database contained
twenty-two cases, only one of which was decided under Iqbal.
Ironically, 12(b)(6) motions filed in “Antitrust” cases under Conley
were more successful (100% of two cases) than under Twombly, an
antitrust case (44% of nine cases), or Iqbal (33% of three cases).
However, the small sample numbers here counsel against reading too
much into the data.
3. Differences in rulings by district courts in different circuit courts of
appeals
Strict “representativeness is not the primary goal of random
263
264
sampling,” and as indicated above, the Database is not a perfectly
random sample in any event. Nonetheless, some readers may wonder
whether the Database’s distribution of district court cases by circuit is
similar to the actual distribution of cases pending by circuit. Table 3
compares these proportions in the Database to the proportions of
actual district court cases, as reported by the Administrative Office of
265
the Courts.
Table 3 indicates that this Database’s proportions of district court
cases from the twelve circuits very roughly approximate the

263. FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 218, at 259.
264. See supra note 198.
265. 2006 REPORT, supra note 222, at 159–61 (providing a basis for actual cases
pending in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 in Table 3 using Table C-1: U.S. District
Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, Terminated and Pending During the 12-Month
Period Ending September 30, 2006); JAMES C. DUFF, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 140–42 (2009), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf [hereinafter
2008 REPORT] (providing the number of U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases
Commenced, Terminated and Pending for fiscal years 2007 and 2008). The figures
for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2009 were not available at the time of this
writing.
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proportions of actual district court cases pending by circuit. It should
be noted that the time period covered by the Database (May 22, 2005
to August 31, 2009) does not precisely match the Administrative
Office of the Courts’ annual reporting period, which ends on
266
September 30.
But the comparison of Database cases to actual
cases pending by circuit may address in some small degree the
concern that some scholars have with studies that focus only on
publicly-available opinions.
Table 3
Number and Percentage of District Court Cases in the Database by Circuit
Compared to Percentages of Actual District Court Cases Pending by Circuit
Cases in the Database
(number of cases and percentage
by circuit)

First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth

Cases
under
Conley

Cases
under
Twombly

Cases
under
Iqbal

All cases
in the
Database

10
2.3%
67
15.1%
49
11.0%
23
5.2%
29
6.5%
55
12.4%
34
7.7%
25
5.6%

15
3.6%
70
16.6%
45
10.7%
25
5.9%
46
10.9%
30
7.1%
36
8.5%
27
6.4%

15
8.7%
41
23.7%
21
12.1%
12
6.9%
13
7.5%
9
5.2%
9
5.2%
4
2.3%

40
3.9%
178
17.1%
115
11.1%
60
5.8%
88
8.4%
94
9.1%
79
7.6%
56
5.4%

Actual percentage of
district court
civil cases by circuit
Average
for 2005
and
2006

Average
for 2007
and
2008

Overall
average
for
2005–
2008

2.8%

2.4%

2.6%

12.7%

13.2%

13.0%

10.1%

18.8%

14.4%

5.5%

4.7%

5.1%

14.9%

12.9%

13.9%

12.1%

7.8%

10.0%

5.7%

5.1%

5.4%

7.0%

6.6%

6.8%

266. Fiscal years 2005 and 2006 roughly cover the time period of the cases in the
Database decided under Conley; fiscal years 2007 and 2008 roughly cover the time
period of the cases in the Database decided under Twombly. No figures on actual
cases pending after September 30, 2008, are available at this writing.
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Tenth
Eleventh
D.C.
Total
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66
14.9%
18
4.1%
44
9.9%
24
5.4%
444
100%

57
13.5%
31
7.4%
33
7.8%
7
1.7%
422
100%

29
16.7%
4
2.3%
8
4.6%
8
4.6%
173
100%

152
14.6%
53
5.1%
85
8.2%
39
3.8%
1039
100%

611

15.8%

14.2%

15.0%

3.6%

3.3%

3.4%

8.6%

10.0%

9.3%

1.2%

1.0%

1.1%

100%

100%

100%

As Table 3 illustrates, district courts in the Third and Fifth Circuits
may be somewhat underrepresented in the Database. For example,
from October 1, 2005, to September 30, 2008, cases pending in
district courts within the Fifth Circuit made up approximately 13.9%
of all district court cases pending; cases chosen for inclusion in the
Database here from district courts in the Fifth Circuit account for
only 8.4% of the cases in the Database, which covers the period from
May 22, 2005, to August 31, 2009.
Conversely, district courts in the Second, Seventh, and D.C.
Circuits may be somewhat overrepresented in the Database.
For example, from October 1, 2005, to September 30, 2008, cases
pending in district courts within the Second Circuit comprised
approximately 13% of all district court cases pending; cases chosen
for inclusion in the Database here from district courts in the Second
Circuit make up 17.1% of the cases in the Database, which covers the
period from May 22, 2005, to August 31, 2009.
The difference between the percentage of actual district court
cases pending by circuit and the percentage of cases in the Database
is greatest when looking only at the cases decided under Iqbal. This is
probably due to the short period of time (approximately three
months) and the smaller number of cases in the Database covered by
Iqbal.
We turn now to possible differences in the rate of granting
12(b)(6) motions depending on the circuit in which a district court
sits. Figure 8 shows the percentage of 12(b)(6) motions granted
(with or without leave to amend) by district courts in the Database
within each of the twelve circuit courts of appeals for the entire
period covered by the Database.
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Figure 8
Percentage of 12(b)(6) Motions in the Database
Granted by District Courts in Circuit
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Eleventh
D.C.

0

20

40

49

60

80

Percentage of 12(b)(6) motions granted
Granted, amend

Grant, no amend

Reference line at 49% shows overall average.
Exact frequencies presented in Appendix Table E.

Recall that about 49% of 12(b)(6) motions overall in the Database
267
were granted (with or without leave to amend). Figure 8 (detailed
in Appendix Table E) shows that district courts in the Second and
D.C. Circuits granted the 12(b)(6) motions (with or without leave to
amend) in the Database at a higher-than-average rate (60% granted
by district court judges in the Second Circuit and 67% granted by
district court judges in the D.C. Circuit). District courts in the Third,
Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits granted 12(b)(6) motions
(with or without leave to amend) in the Database at about the
average rate (49%). Finally, district courts in the First (45%),
268
Seventh (33%), and Eleventh (31%) Circuits granted 12(b)(6)

267. See supra Table 2.
268. The Seventh Circuit, in particular, was vehement (at least before Twombly)
about instructing district courts to adhere to “notice pleading.” See, e.g., Doe v.
Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Any district judge (for that matter, any
defendant) tempted to write ‘this complaint is deficient because it does not contain .
. .’ should stop and think: What rule of law requires a complaint to contain that
allegation?”).
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motions (with or without leave to amend) in the Database at a lower269
than-average rate.
4. The effect of pro se plaintiffs
A plaintiff’s pro se status should leap to mind in any theory about
probable factors that affect a court’s ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion.
It is reasonable to assume that a 12(b)(6) motion has a better chance
of being granted against a pro se plaintiff’s complaint than a
270
complaint filed by a lawyer.
Of all cases in the Database, approximately 28% involved pro se
plaintiffs (281 of 1017 plaintiffs whose status could be determined
271
from the opinion). Interestingly, the percentage of pro se plaintiffs
in the Database declined from Conley (30%) to Twombly (27%) to
272
Iqbal (24%).
“Civil Rights” cases comprised the largest category by nature of suit
273
Figure 9 (as detailed in Appendix
in the Database (about 44%).
Table F) shows that about 50% of plaintiffs in “Civil Rights” cases in
the Database were pro se. Of the Database cases under Conley,
187 (43%) were “Civil Rights” cases, in which 100 (53%) of plaintiffs
were pro se. Under Twombly, 181 (44%) of the Database cases were
“Civil Rights” cases, in which 91 (50%) of plaintiffs were pro se.
Under Iqbal, 78 (45%) of the Database cases were “Civil Rights” cases,
and 30 (38%) of the plaintiffs in those cases were pro se. Note that
274
“Civil Rights” cases are frequently brought by pro se prisoners.
Figure 10 shows the difference in rulings on 12(b)(6) motions
between pro se plaintiffs and plaintiffs represented by counsel under
all three authorities.

269. It would be interesting to compare the district courts’ rates of granting
12(b)(6) motions with the caseload per judge in the various districts, but such a
comparison is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., 2008 REPORT, supra note 265,
at 409–12 (showing statistic for U.S. District Courts—Weighted and Unweighted
Filings per Authorized Judgeship During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30,
2008).
270. See, e.g., BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, STORMING THE COURT 57 (2005) (“Government
statistics showed that legal representation more than doubled the chances that an
individual would win asylum.”).
271. See infra Appendix Table G. This is only slightly higher than the percentage
of all cases filed in federal district courts in fiscal year 2008 by pro se plaintiffs, which
is 26.5% (70,948 pro se cases of 267,257 total filings). 2008 REPORT, supra note 265, at
78–80 (Civil Pro Se And Non-Pro Se Filings, by District, During the 12-Month Period
Ending September 30, 2008).
272. See infra Appendix Table G.
273. See supra Figure 3; infra Appendix Table A.
274. For example, in fiscal year 2008, pro se prisoner petitions made up 71.5% of
all pro se filings in federal district courts (50,756 pro se prisoner petitions of 70,948
total pro se cases filed). 2008 REPORT, supra note 265, at 78–80.
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Figure 9
Percentage of Pro Se Plaintiffs in the Database
by Nature of Suit and Authority
Contract
Tort
Civil rts
Labor
IP
Other
stat

Conley
Twombly
Iqbal
Conley
Twombly
Iqbal
Conley
Twombly
Iqbal
Conley
Twombly
Iqbal
Conley
Twombly
Iqbal
Conley
Twombly
Iqbal
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20
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40
Percentage of plaintiffs who are pro se

60

Reference line at 28% shows overall average percentage
of pro se plaintiffs for all types of cases and authorities.
Exact frequencies shown in Appendix Table F.

Figure 10
Percentage of Rulings in the Database by Status of Plaintiff and Authority
Pro se plaintiffs

Represented plaintiffs
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0
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Exact frequencies presented in Appendix Table G.
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The percentage of 12(b)(6) motions granted in all cases brought
by pro se plaintiffs grew from Conley (67%) to Twombly (69%) to Iqbal
(85%). Under any authority, 12(b)(6) motions were granted at a
much higher rate in cases with a pro se plaintiff than in cases in which
the plaintiff was represented. It appears that the boilerplate language
275
that pro se plaintiffs’ complaints should be treated with leniency is
276
not taken very seriously.
5.

The effects of other factors
The two other factors coded in the Database were whether the case
was brought as a putative class action and whether the ruling on the
motion was recommended by a magistrate judge rather than ruled on
or adopted by a district court judge. The absolute number of cases in
the Database involving class actions and magistrates is too small to be
meaningful. Further, multinomial logistic regressions that included
these two independent variables indicated that neither variable was
statistically significant in predicting the ruling on the 12(b)(6)
motion.
6. Frequency of cases in the Database that were entirely dismissed upon a
grant of a 12(b)(6) motion without leave to amend
Just because a 12(b)(6) motion is granted, even without leave to
amend, does not mean that the entire case has been dismissed.
A 12(b)(6) motion will frequently involve less than all counts brought
or less than all defendants joined in a complaint. In Iqbal, even if the
277
plaintiff is not granted leave to amend on remand, he will still have
a multitude of government-official defendants left in the case. Thus,
while the statistics presented above show, for example, that 39% of
12(b)(6) motions in the Database were granted without leave to
278
amend, that does not mean that entire cases were dismissed at the
same rate.
Only the ruling “grant without leave to amend” could possibly
279
result in the case being entirely dismissed at that time.
Looking
275. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
276. But see, e.g., Felder v. Del. County Office of Servs. for the Aging, No. 08-4182,
2009 WL 2278514, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2004) (“It would be unfair to allow a
Plaintiff to file a pro se Complaint on the standard form, which provides minimal
room for elaboration on the factual issues [seven lines], and then dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint under Rule 8 for failure to provide more factual allegations.”).
277. See Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 574 F.3d 820, 822 (2d Cir. 2009) (remanding the case to
district court in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision).
278. See supra Table 1.
279. In some cases, the court warns that if the plaintiff does not amend within a
certain time period, the complaint will be dismissed, but if judgment was not
entered, I coded that as a “grant with leave to amend.”
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only at the 403 cases in the Database in which the court granted the
12(b)(6) motion without leave to amend, the rate of cases entirely
dismissed upon that ruling actually declined from Conley (66%) to
Twombly (61%) and Iqbal (62%), but the distribution was not
statistically significant. For pro se plaintiffs incurring a ruling of “grant
without leave to amend,” however, 80% saw their cases entirely
dismissed, as compared to only 51% for represented plaintiffs.
Figure 11 presents these results.
Figure 11
Cases in the Database Entirely Dismissed
upon Grant of 12(b)(6) Motion Without Leave to Amend
By pro se status of plaintiff

Percentage of cases dismissed

By authority
80
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60

40
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Twombly

Iqbal

0

Represented

Pro se

Includes only those 403 cases in the Database in which a
12(b)(6) motion was granted without leave to amend.

B. Logistic Regressions
1. Multinomial logistic regression using the ruling on the 12(b)(6) motion as
the dependent variable
To better predict the possible effects of Twombly and Iqbal on the
ruling on 12(b)(6) motions, I performed a multinomial logistic
280
281
regression using Stata. The multinomial logistic regression model
280. A multinomial logistic regression tests the strength of a model’s various
independent variables in predicting the outcome, or dependent variable.
Its purpose is the same as the more commonly known multiple linear regression,
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“estimat[es] the probability of different alternatives relative to the
282
In this regression, the outcome, or
probability of a baseline.”
dependent variable, is the ruling on the 12(b)(6) motion. The
outcome possibilities are “deny,” “mixed ruling,” “grant with leave to
amend,” and “grant without leave to amend.” I set the base outcome
as “deny,” presumably the best outcome for the plaintiff (nonmovant).
The independent variables, or possible predictors, used in this
model included the one in which we are most interested—whether
the case was decided under Conley, Twombly, or Iqbal—and whether
plaintiff was represented by counsel or was proceeding pro se, the
nature of suit, and the circuit within which the district court sits.
I did not include the indicator variables for judge type and class
action in the model; earlier models that included these variables
showed that they had no statistical significance and that their
presence did not appreciably increase the models’ ability to explain
the differences in ruling outcomes.
Dummy (or “binary” or “indicator”) variables were created for the
283
six major types of suit and the twelve circuit courts of appeal. Based
on the frequencies in the Database, 12(b)(6) motions are least
frequently granted in contract cases as compared to the other major
types of suit, and least frequently granted by district courts in the
Eleventh Circuit as compared to district courts in the other circuits.
Accordingly, I omitted the indicator variables for “Contract” and
“11th Circuit” to use these as baselines. Note that the regression
contains only 1017 cases, whereas the Database as a whole contains
except that in multiple regression, the dependent variable is linear (also called
“continuous” or “quantitative”), while in logistic regression, the dependent variable is
categorical (also called “qualitative”; two-outcome variables are also called “binary” or
“dichotomous”).
The major dependent variable in this study—“Ruling”—is
categorical; the categories are “grant without leave to amend,” “grant with leave to
amend,” “mixed,” and “deny.” The other dependent variable in this study—whether
a case is entirely dismissed upon the grant of a 12(b)(6) motion—is binary (entire
case dismissed or entire case not dismissed). The multinomial logistic regression
model is referred to by different names in various disciplines. See DAVID W. HOSMER
& STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION 260 (2d ed. 2000) (“[T]he
model is frequently referred to as the discrete choice model in business and
econometric literature while it is called the multinomial, polychotomous or polytomous
logistic regression model in the health and life sciences.”); see also DAMODAR
GUJARATI, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMETRICS 451–53 (2d ed. 1999) (distinguishing binary
regression models from multinomial regression models).
281. Stata is a commonly used statistical software package available commercially.
282. Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act?, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 608 (2007).
283. See HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra note 280, at 62 (“[D]iscrete nominal scale
variables are included properly into the [logistic] analysis only when they have been
recoded into design variables.”).
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1039 cases. Twenty-two cases (2% of the total) were eliminated from
the regression because each case was missing a value for at least one
284
variable. Table 4 presents the results of this regression.
Table 4
Multinomial Logistic Regression on Rulings on 12(b)(6) Motions in
the Database of Cases Between May 22, 2005 and August 31, 2009
(four “ruling” outcomes; “deny” is base outcome)
Number of observations = 1017 log likelihood = -1186.216
Probability > chi-squared = 0.0000 pseudo R-squared = 0.0954
Likelihood Ratio chi-squared (57 degrees of freedom) = 250.32
*Probability < 0.1 (considered significant at confidence level of 90%).
Odds comparing “grant without leave to amend” to “deny”:

Variable
Twombly
Iqbal
Pro se
First Cir
Second Cir
Third Cir
Fourth Cir
Fifth Cir
Sixth Cir
Seventh Cir
Eighth Cir
Ninth Cir
Tenth Cir
D.C. Cir
Tort
Civ rts
Labor

Relative
risk ratio

Std.
Error

z

1.342
1.398
5.119
3.068
3.919
2.062
2.859
1.948
3.123
1.334
1.695
2.500
2.903
8.478
1.367
1.828
1.023

0.261
0.374
1.348
1.795
1.568
0.851
1.343
0.828
1.315
0.593
0.808
0.994
1.530
5.418
0.461
0.544
0.387

1.51
1.25
6.20
1.92
3.42
1.75
2.24
1.57
2.70
0.65
1.11
2.31
2.02
3.34
0.93
2.03
0.06

P>|z|

[90%
Conf.

Interval]

0.131
0.210
0.000*
0.055*
0.001*
0.080*
0.025*
0.116
0.007*
0.517
0.268
0.021*
0.043*
0.001*
0.354
0.043*
0.951

0.974
0.901
3.320
1.172
2.030
1.045
1.320
0.969
1.562
0.642
0.774
1.300
1.220
2.963
0.785
1.120
0.550

1.848
2.170
7.894
8.032
7.567
4.067
6.192
3.919
6.244
2.770
3.714
4.808
6.907
24.255
2.381
2.983
1.905

284. See JOSEPH L. SCHAFER, ANALYSIS OF INCOMPLETE MULTIVARIATE DATA 1 (1997)
(“Many statistical software packages . . . automatically omit from a linear regression
analysis any case that has a missing value for any variable. . . . When the incomplete
cases comprise only a small fraction (say, five percent or less) then case deletion may
be a perfectly reasonable solution to the missing-data problem.”).

2010]
IP
Other stat

DO TWOMBLY AND IQBAL MATTER EMPIRICALLY?
0.661
1.875

0.329
0.574

-0.83
2.06

0.405
0.040*

0.291
1.134

619
1.499
3.102

Odds comparing “grant with leave to amend” to “deny”
(indicator variables for circuits omitted from Table, although not
from regression; no variable for circuit was statistically significant at a
90% confidence level):

Variable
Twombly
Iqbal
Pro se
Tort
Civ rts
Labor
IP
Other stat

Relative
risk ratio

Std.
Error

z

P>|z|

[90%
Conf.

Interval]

1.806
4.035
4.352
4.318
2.535
1.228
0.748
4.090

0.546
1.398
1.527
2.321
1.222
0.874
0.661
2.090

1.96
4.03
4.19
2.72
1.65
0.29
-0.33
2.76

0.050*
0.000*
0.000*
0.007*
0.100*
0.773
0.742
0.006*

1.099
2.282
2.444
1.783
1.001
0.381
0.175
1.764

2.969
7.135
7.750
10.454
5.529
3.959
3.198
9.481

Odds comparing “mixed ruling” to “deny”
(indicator variables for circuits omitted from Table, although not
from regression; no variable for circuit was statistically significant at a
90% confidence level):

Variable
Twombly
Iqbal
Pro se
Tort
Civ rts
Labor
IP
Other stat

Relative
risk ratio

Std.
Error

z

1.410
1.255
1.462
1.139
1.715
0.224
0.191
0.951

0.282
0.349
0.414
0.364
0.480
0.107
0.115
0.288

1.72
0.82
1.34
0.41
1.93
-3.12
-2.75
-0.17

P>|z|

[90%
Conf.

Interval]

0.086*
0.414
0.179
0.684
0.054*
0.002*
0.006*
0.868

1.015
0.794
0.918
0.673
1.082
0.101
0.071
0.578

1.960
1.983
2.330
1.926
2.718
0.493
0.515
1.565

Notes to Table 4: “Deny” is designated as the base outcome for the
ruling. Each other possible outcome (“mixed ruling,” “grant with
leave to amend,” and “grant without leave to amend”) is compared to
the base outcome. I omitted the indicator variables for “Contract”
and “11th Circuit” to use as baselines.
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The “pseudo R ” for this model is 0.095. Loosely, the pseudo R is a
measure of how much of the outcome (here, the ruling) is explained
by all the various factors used in the model (here, such as the
285
authority).
The model here accounts for only about 9.5% of the
variance in rulings on the motions. However, the model is still
meaningful: the probability that the model does not explain the
286
variance in rulings at all is less than 0.01%.
A value greater than 1.0 for the “relative risk ratio” for any variable
indicates that the presence of that variable (holding all other
variables constant) increases the relative risk that a 12(b)(6) motion
will be granted (with or without leave to amend), or will result in a
mixed ruling, over the relative risk of the motion being denied.
However, if the relative risk ratio for the variable is not significant
(p < 0.10), we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the variable has
no impact on the ruling on the motion.
The relative risk ratio can thus be used to gauge the effect of
Twombly and Iqbal on rulings as compared to the baseline category,
287
which is Conley. The effect of either Twombly or Iqbal, in comparison
to Conley, is at least 1.34 on the relative risk of the motion being
granted without leave to amend over being denied, meaning that the
percentage increase of relative risk of the motion being granted
without leave to amend over being denied is approximately 34%.
However, this relative risk ratio (for grants without leave to amend as
compared to denials) is not statistically significant (p = 0.131 under
Twombly and p = 0.210 under Iqbal).
Comparing grants with leave to amend to denials under either
Twombly or Iqbal, the relative risk ratios are statistically significant.
Under Twombly, the relative risk that a 12(b)(6) motion will be
granted with leave to amend, rather than denied, would be expected
to increase by a factor of 1.81 over Conley, holding all other variables
constant. At the 90% confidence level, this relative risk ratio could
be as low as 1.1 (almost evenly likely) or as high as 2.97 (almost three

285. See generally, Michael J. Vitacco et al., Predicting Short-Term Institutional
Aggression in Forensic Patients: A Multi-Trait Method For Understanding Subtypes2 of
Aggression, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 308, 315 (2009) (applying the pseudo R to
determine the impact of different variables on overall variance). The pseudo R22 is
one of several measures developed in logistic regression to approximate the R in
linear regression. Because of mathematical
differences between linear regression
and logistic regression, the pseudo R2 in logistic regression is a less satisfactory2
measure of the “goodness of fit” of the model, and is typically far lower, than the R
in a good linear regression model. HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra note 280, at 166–67.
286. This is indicated by the line “Probability > chi-squared = 0.0000.”
287. For a detailed explanation of the interpretation of odds ratios, see generally
HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra note 280, at 189–92, 286–87.
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times as likely) as a motion being granted with leave to amend,
relative to being denied, under Conley.
Under Iqbal, the relative risk that a 12(b)(6) motion will be granted
with leave to amend, rather than denied, would be expected to
increase by a factor of 4.04 over Conley, holding all other variables
constant. At the 90% confidence level, this relative risk ratio could
be as low as 2.28 or as high as 7.14. Under Iqbal, then, it is more than
twice as likely, and possibly more than seven times more likely, for a
12(b)(6) motion to be granted with leave to amend, rather than
denied, as under Conley, at a 90% confidence level.
The relative risk of a 12(b)(6) motion receiving a “mixed” ruling
relative to being denied would be expected to increase by a factor of
1.41 under Twombly than under Conley, holding all other variables
constant; this is also statistically significant. At the 90% confidence
level, this ratio could be as low as 1.02 or as high as 1.96. The relative
risk ratio of a 12(b)(6) motion receiving a “mixed” ruling relative to
being denied under Iqbal as compared to Conley, however, is not
statistically significant.
Table 4 also shows that, by far, the variable with the largest
predicted effect on whether a 12(b)(6) motion will be granted
(with or without leave to amend), as opposed to the motion being
denied, is whether the plaintiff is pro se. The relative risk of a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a pro se plaintiff’s complaint being
granted without leave to amend, rather than denied, is over five times
greater (5.12 times greater) than for a represented plaintiff. At a
90% confidence level, this ratio could be as low as 3.32 times greater
or as high as 7.89 times greater. Note that the regression model in
Table 4 holds constant the “pro se plaintiff” variable when testing for
the effect of other variables.
Similarly, the relative risk of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a pro se
plaintiff’s complaint being granted with leave to amend, rather than
denied, is over four times greater (4.35 times greater) than for a
represented plaintiff. At a 90% confidence level, this ratio could be
as low as 2.44 times greater or as high as 7.75 times greater.
As discussed earlier, certain types of suit appear to be associated
with how the court will rule on a motion. In the Database, 12(b)(6)
motions were least frequently granted in “Contract” cases; thus,
I used “Contract” cases as the baseline. The relative risk that a
12(b)(6) motion will be granted without leave to amend, rather than
denied, in a “Civil Rights” case is 1.83 times greater than in a
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“Contracts” case, holding all other variables constant. The relative
risk that a 12(b)(6) motion will be granted without leave to amend,
rather than denied, in a case involving “Other Statutes” is 1.88 times
greater than in “Contract” cases, holding all other variables
289
constant. Both of these ratios are statistically significant.
The circuit within which a district court sits may also have a
predictive effect on how the court will rule on a 12(b)(6) motion.
Again using the raw frequencies in the Database as the guide for
choosing a baseline circuit, district courts in the Eleventh Circuit
showed the lowest rate of granting 12(b)(6) motions; I therefore
chose the indicator variable for the Eleventh Circuit as the baseline.
The relative risk that a district court in the First, Second, Third,
Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits will grant without leave
to amend, rather than deny, a 12(b)(6) motion are greater than 1.0
at, at least, a 90% confidence level, than in the apparently most
lenient Eleventh Circuit.
2. Logistic regression using the factor of whether the case was entirely
dismissed as the dependent variable
I also performed a logistic regression in which “entire case
dismissed” was the dependent variable (coded “0” if the case was not
entirely dismissed upon the grant of the 12(b)(6) motion without
leave to amend, and coded “1” if it was entirely dismissed). Again,
only those cases in which the motion was granted without leave to
amend are included in the regression model. Table 5 presents the
results.
Table 5
Logistic Regression on Cases Entirely Dismissed Upon Grant of 12(b)(6)
Motion Without Leave to Amend in the Database of Cases
Between May 22, 2005 and August 31, 2009
Number of observations = 389 log likelihood = -216.751
Probability > chi-squared = 0.0000 pseudo R-squared = 0.1528
Likelihood ratio chi-squared (19 degrees of freedom) = 78.17
*Probability < 0.1 (considered significant at confidence level of 90%).

288. p = 0.04. The 90% confidence interval is 1.12 to 2.98.
289. p = 0.04. The 90% confidence interval is 1.13 to 3.10.
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Odds
Variable
Twombly
Iqbal
Pro se
First Cir
Second Cir
Third Cir
Fourth Cir
Fifth Cir
Sixth Cir
Seventh Cir
Eighth Cir
Ninth Cir
Tenth Cir
D.C. Cir
Tort
Civ rts
Labor
IP
Other stat

0.841
0.692
3.482
1.326
4.114
1.847
2.052
1.439
1.756
0.629
1.106
3.956
0.752
3.113
0.296
1.533
1.242
0.563
1.265

Std.
Error

z

0.220
0.242
0.951
1.082
2.559
1.173
1.412
0.949
1.113
0.460
0.808
2.573
0.538
2.269
0.158
0.670
0.727
0.464
0.575

-0.66
-1.05
4.57
0.35
2.27
0.97
1.05
0.55
0.89
-0.63
0.14
2.11
-0.40
1.56
-2.27
0.98
0.37
-0.70
0.52

623

P>|z|

[90%
Conf.

Interval]

0.509
0.294
0.000*
0.729
0.023*
0.334
0.296
0.581
0.374
0.526
0.890
0.034*
0.690
0.119
0.023*
0.329
0.711
0.486
0.605

0.547
0.389
2.222
0.346
1.479
0.650
0.662
0.486
0.620
0.189
0.332
1.357
0.231
0.940
0.123
0.747
0.474
0.145
0.599

1.294
1.231
5.457
5.078
11.443
5.248
6.362
4.258
4.980
2.093
3.681
11.529
2.441
10.307
0.714
3.147
3.253
2.185
2.670

Notes to Table 5: Only includes 389 cases in the Database in which
the entire case was dismissed upon the grant of a 12(b)(6) motion
without leave to amend. (The total number differs from the total in
Figure 11 (403 cases) because it was not possible to determine the
nature of suit in all cases, and any case in which the value for at least
one variable was missing was eliminated.) I omitted the indicator
variables for “Contract” and “11th Circuit” to use as baselines. I did
not include the indicator variables for judge type and class action in
the model.
The results of the logistic regression indicate that the authority
under which a motion was decided had no statistically significant
effect on whether a case was entirely dismissed upon the grant of a
12(b)(6) motion without leave to amend. The variable with the
largest predicted effect on whether a case was entirely dismissed was
whether the plaintiff was pro se. The odds that a pro se plaintiff’s
complaint would be entirely dismissed upon the grant of a 12(b)(6)
motion were 3.48 times greater than the odds that a represented
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plaintiff’s complaint would be entirely dismissed (at a 90%
confidence level, the odds could be as low as 2.22 or as high as 5.46).
In addition, it is significantly more likely that a district court in the
Second Circuit or the Ninth Circuit would entirely dismiss a case
upon the grant of a 12(b)(6) motion than a district court in the
Eleventh Circuit. Finally, and somewhat surprisingly, it is significantly
less likely that a Tort case would be entirely dismissed upon the grant
of a 12(b)(6) motion than a Contract case.
CONCLUSION
290

Notice pleading may not be “dead” in federal court, but the
prognosis is grave. Even before Twombly, courts had been straining to
heighten the pleading standard. Twombly began the dismantling of
the well-worn principles federal courts had used for decades to
decide 12(b)(6) motions by replacing Conley’s “no set of facts”
standard with the “plausibility” standard and by neglecting to
mention that all reasonable inferences should be made in the
plaintiff’s favor. Even so, the Court in Twombly insisted that it was
adhering to “notice pleading,” continuing to cite the Conley
“fair notice” language with approval.
Several aspects of Iqbal appear designed to hasten the death of
notice pleading. First, the Court failed to mention notice pleading at
all, even as a background reference to the pleadings regime once
proudly ushered in by the FRCP; and unlike Twombly, Iqbal did not
expressly reject “heightened” pleading. Second, Iqbal uncritically
embraced Twombly’s “plausibility” standard without providing much
further guidance except for the highly subjective directive to the
lower courts to use “judicial experience and common sense.” Third,
Iqbal reinvigorated the always murky distinction between “facts” and
“conclusions” in a complaint, inviting judges to somehow identify the
latter and set them aside.
This study provides some evidence that district courts are taking
Twombly and Iqbal to heart. Especially after Iqbal, they appear to be
granting 12(b)(6) motions at a significantly higher rate than they did
under Conley—which was already a sizeable 49% in the Database in
the two-year period before Twombly. In addition, Twombly and Iqbal
are poised to have their greatest impact on civil rights cases, simply
because those cases are by far the most likely type of case to be
attacked by a 12(b)(6) motion.

290. Spencer, supra note 137, at 431.
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Many may not mourn the passing of notice pleading. For example,
a recent report by a blue-ribbon panel suggesting improvements to
the civil procedure rules recommends the following: “Notice
pleading should be replaced by fact-based pleading. Pleadings
should set forth with particularity all of the material facts that are
known to the pleading party to establish the pleading party’s claims
291
or affirmative defenses.”
But if federal courts are to swing back to a code-pleading-like
regime, it would best be done by the normal rule amendment
process. The “plausibility” standard injects too much subjectivity into
the ruling, and the very word “plausible” implies a value judgment on
the merits of the case at the pleadings stage. This was not the
original intent of the FRCP, and such a profound shift in philosophy
should be accomplished by deliberative and representative
consensus.

291. FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL
LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 5 (2009), http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.crm?
Section=Publications (follow “All Publications” hyperlink under the “Publications”
tab; then follow “Publications of General Interest” hyperlink, follow “2009 ACTLIAALS OFFICAL FINAL REPORT” hyperlink).
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Appendix Table A
(Backup for Figures 3 and 4)
Number and Percentage of Cases in the Database by Nature of Suit
Nature of suit
Contract292
Tort
Civil
rts, all
Constitutional
civ rts
Title VII
ADA, ADEA
Other
Civ rts293
Labor, all
ERISA, FLSA
LMRA, other
IP
Other stat, all
Antitrust
Cons Credit
RICO
All other stat294
Total

Conley

Twombly

Iqbal

Total

56
13%
72
16%
190
43%
141
32%
24
5%
15
3%
10
2%
27
6%
19
4%
8
2%
11
3%
88
20%
2
0%
17
4%
8
2%
61
14%
444

51
12%
48
12%
186
44%
135
32%
24
6%
16
4%
11
3%
30
7%
20
5%
10
2%
18
4%
86
21%
9
2%
15
4%
8
2%
54
13%
419295

12
13%
21
12%
78
45%
55
32%
15
9%
7
4%
1
1%
9
5%
7
4%
2
1%
4
2%
39
23%
3
2%
12
7%
2
1%
22
13%
173

129
12%
141
14%
454
44%
331
32%
63
6%
38
4%
22
2%
66
6%
46
4%
20
2%
33
3%
213
21%
14
1%
44
4%
18
2%
137
13%
1036

292. Includes two “Real Property” cases.
293. Includes four prisoner petitions that are not civil-rights based.
294. Includes four “Immigration,” one “Bankruptcy,” and twelve “Federal Tax.”
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Appendix Table B
(Backup for Figure 5)
Number and Percentage of Rulings on 12(b)(6) Motions for
Cases in the Database by Nature of Suit and Authority

Nature of suit
Contract

Grant

Ruling on 12(b)(6) motion
Mixed
Deny
Total

43
33%

45
35%

41
32%

Tort

62
44%

43
31%

36
26%

Constitutional civ
rts

177
53%

111
34%

43
13%

Title VII

31
49%

20
32%

12
19%

ADA, ADEA

20
53%

10
26%

8
21%

Other civ rts

11
50%

4
18%

7
32%

ERISA, FLSA

18
39%

6
13%

22
48%

LMRA, other

12
60%

1
5%

7
35%

IP

11
33%

4
12%

18
55%

Antitrust

7
50%

6
43%

1
7%

129
12% of column
100% of row
141
14% of column
100% of row
331
32% of column
100% of row
63
6% of column
100% of row
38
4% of column
100% of row
22
2% of column
100% of row
46
4% of column
100% of row
20
2% of column
100% of row
33
3% of column
100% of row
14
1% of column
100% of row

295. The total here is three less than the total number of cases in the Database
under Twombly (422) because the “nature of suit” in the three cases could not be
determined from the opinion.
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Cons credit

26
59%

6
14%

12
27%

RICO

7
39%

6
33%

5
28%

Other stat

78
57%

30
22%

29
21%

Total

503
49%

292
28%

241
23%

[Vol. 59:553
44
4% of column
100% of row
18
2% of column
100% of row
137
13% of column
100% of row
1036
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Appendix Table C
(Backup for Figure 6)
Number and Percentage of Rulings on 12(b)(6) Motions for All Cases in the
Database by Simplified Nature of Suit and Authority
Ruling on 12(b)(6) motion
Mixed ruling
Deny

Grant (with or
without leave to
amend)

Conley

Twombly

Iqbal

Conley

Twombly

Iqbal

Conley

Twombly

Iqbal

Nature of
suit

18
32%
29
40%
95
50%

18
35%
22
46%
99
53%

7
32%
11
52%
45
58%

21
38%
23
32%
60
32%

17
33%
16
33%
62
33%

7
32%
4
19%
23
29%

17
30%
20
28%
35
18%

16
31%
10
21%
25
13%

8
36%
6
29%
10
13%

14
47%
5
28%
43
50%

4
44%
2
50%
28
72%

3
11%
0
16
18%

2
7%
4
22%
24
28%

2
22%
0

Other
stat

12
44%
4
36%
47
53%

8
21%

12
44%
7
64%
25
28%

14
47%
9
50%
19
22%

3
33%
2
50%
3
8%

Total

205
46%

201
48%

97
56%

123
28%

125
30%

44
25%

116
26%

93
22%

32
19%

Contract
Tort
Civ rts
Labor
IP

Note to Appendix Table C: Percentages in parentheses represent the
percentage of rulings in the Database that were decided under the
particular authority for that particular nature of suit. For example, in
“Contract” cases decided under Conley, 32% of all 12(b)(6) motions
were granted (with or without leave to amend), 38% received a
mixed ruling, and 30% were denied.
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Appendix Table D
(Backup for Figure 7)
Number and Percentage of Rulings on 12(b)(6) Motions for All Cases in the
Database by Detailed Nature of Suit and Authority
Ruling on 12(b)(6) motion
Mixed ruling
Deny

Grant (with or
without leave to
amend)

Conley

Twombly

Iqbal

Conley

Twombly

Iqbal

Conley

Twombly

Iqbal

Nature of suit

18
32%
29
40%
70
50%

18
35%
22
46%
74
55%

7
32%
11
52%
33
60%

21
38%
23
32%
46
33%

17
33%
16
33%
46
34%

7
32%
4
19%
19
35%

17
30%
20
28%
25
18%

16
31%
10
21%
15
11%

8
36%
6
29%
3
6%

10
42%
8
53%

13
54%
8
50%

8
53%
4
57%

9
38%
4
27%

8
33%
5
31%

3
20%
1
14%

5
21%
3
20%

3
13%
3
19%

4
27%
2
29%

Other civ rts

7
70%

4
36%

0

1
10%

3
27%

0

2
20%

4
36%

1
100%

ERISA, FLSA

6
32%
6
75%

9
45%
5
50%

3
43%
1
50%

3
16%
0

2
10%
0

1
14%
1
50%

10
53%
2
25%

9
45%
5
50%

3
43%
0

IP

4
36%

5
28%

2
50%

0

4
22%

0

7
64%

9
50%

2
50%

Antitrust

2
100%
8
47%

4
44%
7
47%

1
33%
11
92%

0

2
67%
1
8%

0
6
35%

1
11%
6
40%

0

3
18%

4
44%
2
13%

4
50%
33
54%
205
46%

2
25%
30
56%
201
48%

1
50%
15
68%
97
56%

1
13%
12
20%
123
28%

5
62%
13
24%
125
30%

0

3
37%
16
26%
116
26%

1
13%
11
20%
93
22%

1
50%
2
9%
32
19%

Contract
Tort
Constitutional
civ rts
Title VII
ADA, ADEA

LMRA, other

Cons credit
RICO
Other stat
Total

5
23%
44
25%

0
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Note to Appendix Table D: Percentages in parentheses represent the
percentage of rulings in the Database decided under the particular
authority for that particular nature of suit. For example, in
“Contract” cases decided under Conley, 32% of all 12(b)(6) motions
were granted (with or without leave to amend), 38% received a
mixed ruling, and 30% were denied.
Appendix Table E
(Backup for Figure 8)
Number and Percentage of Rulings in the Database on 12(b)(6) Motions
by District Courts in Circuits

Circuit
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Eleventh
D.C.
Total

Deny

Ruling
Mixed

Grant

Total

% of Column

7
18%
27
15%
27
24%
14
23%
27
31%
23
25%
26
33%
17
30%
33
22%
9
17%

15
38%
45
25%
30
26%
13
22%
23
26%
26
28%
27
34%
12
21%
43
28%
19
36%

18
45%
106
60%
58
50%
33
55%
38
43%
45
48%
26
33%
27
48%
76
50%
25
47%

40

3.9%

178

17.1%

115

11.1%

60

5.8%

88

6.5%

94

9.1%

79

7.6%

56

5.4%

152

14.6%

53

5.1%

29
34%
4
10%
243
23%

30
35%
9
23%
292
28%

26
31%
26
67%
504
49%

85

8.2%

39

3.8%

1039

100%
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Appendix Table F
(Backup for Figure 9)
Number and Percentage of Represented and Pro Se Plaintiffs in the Database
by Nature of Suit and Authority
Pro Se
Plaintiff

Conley

Represented

Pro se

48
92%

50
100%

22
100%

4
8%

0

0

120
97%

4
3%

Tort

66
92%

40
85%

20
95%

6
8%

7
15%

1
5%

126
90%

14
10%

Civ rts

87
47%

90
50%

48
62%

100
53%

91
50%

30
38%

225
50%

221
50%

Labor

27
100%

26
93%

8
89%

0

2
7%

1
11%

61
95%

3
5%

IP

9
82%

18
100%

4
100%

2
18%

0

0

31
94%

2
6%

Other
stat

69
80%

74
87%

30
77%

17
20%

11
13%

9
22%

173
82%

37
18%

Total

306
70%

298
73%

132
76%

129
30%

111
27%

41
24%

736
72%

281
28%

Iqbal

Iqbal

Contract

Twombly

Twombly

Total
(all cases)

Conley

Represented
Plaintiff

Notes to Appendix Table F: The Table does not include cases in
which the status of the plaintiff or the nature of the suit could not be
determined from the opinion. Percentages in parentheses are
percentages of cases in the Database by nature of suitand by
authority. For example, 92% of all plaintiffs in “Contract” cases
under Conley in the Database were represented by counsel; 8% were
not.
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Appendix Table G
(Backup for Figure 10)
Number and Percentage of Rulings in the Database on 12(b)(6) Motions
by Status of Plaintiff (Represented or Pro Se) and Authority
Ruling on 12(b)(6) motion
Mixed ruling
Deny

Conley

Twombly

Iqbal

Conley

Twombly

Iqbal

Conley

Twombly

Iqbal

Grant
(with or without
leave to amend)

112
37%

117
39%

62
47%

93
30%

98
33%

40
30%

101
33%

84
28%

30
23%

Pro se

86
67%

78
69%

35
85%

29
22%

25
22%

4
10%

14
11%

10
9%

2
5%

Total

198
45%

195
47%

97
56%

122
28%

123
30%

44
25%

115
26%

94
23%

32
19%

Status of
plaintiff
Represented

Notes to Appendix Table G: The Table does not include cases in
which the status of the plaintiff or the nature of suit could not be
determined from the opinion. Percentages in parentheses represent
the percentage of the rulings in the Database that were decided
under the particular authority for that status of plaintiff.
For example, in cases decided under Conley, when the plaintiff was
represented by counsel, 37% of 12(b)(6) motions were granted (with
or without leave to amend), 30% received a mixed ruling, and 33%
were denied; in cases decided under Conley, when the plaintiff was
pro se, 67% of 12(b)(6) motions were granted (with or without leave
to amend), 22% received a mixed ruling, and 11% were denied.

